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
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## The Late E. C. Dyason.

F. W. Eggleston.

I do not think it can be said that anybody contributed so much as E. C. Dyason to the work of the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the organisations affiliated with it and working for the same cause. There was no phase of their intellectual work, or their organisation, or their finance, in which he did not play a crucial part. He was an ardent worker for peace; he was an authority on international affairs, a most efficient organiser and gave generous financial support. Sir Robert Garran, Sir John Latham and myself were at the Conference in Paris in 1919 when Lionel Curtis formed the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the three of us became foundation members of it. When we returned to Melbourne, Sir John Latham and I arranged with a number of others, of whom I think Dyason was one, to form the Melbourne Branch of the League of Nations. No local organisation of the Royal Institute of International Affairs was formed for some years; we were content to pay our subscriptions to Chatham House and get the publications from there.

In 1925 the first meeting of those interested in the relations of Pacific people was held at Honolulu and a delegation from Australia attended it. This provided for a further meeting in August 1927. A delegation from Australia attended at Honolulu and met delegations from America, Great Britain, China, Japan, New Zealand and Canada. The result of their deliberations was the inauguration of the Institute of Pacific Relations to discuss international issues of the Pacific area. Commonwealth delegates at this meeting arranged that the Royal Institute of International Affairs should be affiliated with the Institute of Pacific Relations and act as its organ in the United Kingdom; while in the Dominions branches of the Royal Institute should be formed and be affiliated to act as national groups of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It will be seen that this was a somewhat complicated arrangement in itself, while the existence of other bodies, like the League of Nations Union, which had similar objects and many of the same personnel, had to be taken into account.

This is where Dyason came in, and he set himself to organise a central body which could act as secretary for all these institutes and leagues and any other bodies which could be worked with them. It was intended that the central body should provide a common staff, an office, and possibly collect money for them. He thus organised the Bureau of Social and International Affairs as a non-profit-making company. This was registered on the seventh day of August 1929 in Melbourne and it still provides some services for the various bodies I have mentioned in Melbourne.

It is an unfortunate fact that most men who are generally interested in these matters are usually not good organisers. They are generally absorbed in other work and the ordinary business man regards them with some suspicion as intellectuals. For such persons organisation is a difficult task and they find it even more difficult to obtain the necessary financial support. Dyason was a busy man. He had a large stockbroking business and was a Director of about fifty companies; but he had plenty of surplus vitality and also the "know-how" of organisation, while, as a most successful business man, he could appeal to men of money. Thus the various organisations got a home, secretarial assistance and financial support on a scale which was astonishing to most of us, like myself, who had been used to seeing intellectual work done on a rather humble scale.

Dyason's work for this and other causes was performed at no small sacrifice to his health, and when he attended as one of the delegates which went to the I.P.R. Conference at Yosemite in 1936, he spent a good deal of his time in hospital and was unable to take the part he would certainly have taken if he had been in his proper form. Nevertheless, his contribution was exceedingly important. Two Russian delegates attended the Conference, M. Molitev of the Moscow Academy of Sciences, and Vladimir Romm who has since been liquidated by Stalin.

At that time Russia was regarded as a leader in social advance. The two 5-year plans, it was thought, had inaugurated a new era. If you wanted to solve a problem, you just sat down and drew a lan and it was ipso facto settled. The Russians were therefore the centre of all attention. Round tables were organised to discuss Russian problems. They were introduced by Mrs. Barbara Wootton in a speech in which the brilliance of the language was equalled by the brilliance of the statistics. The Russian national income had increased, I remember her saying, by 600 per cent. in less than ten years. Dyason had been in Russia and understood Russian statistics. He was able to show that the income from the land activities of

the Russian people had fallen catastrophically owing to their objection to collectivism. This being so, if Mrs. Wootton's figures were correct, the rise in other income must have been astronomic. In fact, he suggested they were unbelievable. This convincing demonstration was not welcomed by some people at the Conference.

Dyason's work as an organiser, financier and contributor was invaluable when the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin—the predecessor of this magazine—was formed. He had grasped the importance for Australia of cultivating relations with the Asiatic peoples based on accurate facts, and he took a leading part in the organisation of the magazine. His imagination and initiative were exercised in the choice of capable editors, and in organising the office as an efficient research bureau. His own contributions were outstanding.

This venture was an interesting experience for me who has always treated myself as a student, for I was able to watch a brilliant executive with vision handling an undertaking which differed from any that he had been concerned with up to that date, and doing it, I feel justified in saying, with conspicuous success.

Dyason was one of the team which represented the Australian Institute of International Affairs at the Commonwealth Relations Conference in 1938. This Conference, which sat at Lapstone over the Nepean River, was a brilliant one attended by men like Lord Lothian, Ernest Bevin, Sir Charles Burnett Stewart, Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, Lionel Curtis, H. V. Hodson, I. S. Macadam, Sir Alfred Zimmern, Professor Hancock, Sir John Pratt, Mr. Downey Stewart of New Zealand, E. J. Tarr and Professor Percy Corbett of Canada, and Mr. Hoffmeyr and Professor Hoernlé of South Africa. The Conference adopted a rule limiting speeches to three minutes. This suited Dyason's epigrammatic style and he was usually able to use his time effectively. The Conference sat during the Munich crisis and the British delegates were called upon to make world broadcasts.

I think it is correct to say that the Bureau of Social and International Affairs with its principal institutes and leagues did more sustained work on matters of major public importance than any body of a similar kind which had worked in Melbourne up to that date. This required money and Dyason was responsible for this. He not only succeeded in collecting a great deal from Melbourne citizens, but made contributions himself which were sufficient to secure the financial structure, and later, by the foundation of the Dyason Trust, he has made a permanent provision from which the bodies affiliated with the Bureau derive a considerable income, about £700 a year.

This record covers only matters in which I personally participated. I cannot therefore speak of the British Commonwealth Relations Conference in Canada last year where he was leader of the Australian delegation. His tragic death took place on his way home from this meeting and it may thus be said that he died on duty, but after having provided the means by which his work may be made permanently fruitful.

May 13, 1950.

## The Dyason Foundation.

#### For the Study of the Psychology of Conflict.

The late E. C. Dyason left Australia in 1940 with a scheme of going to Japan with U.S. backing, and exploring ways of bridging the gap in feeling between Australia and Japan. The progress of the War blocked this project but Dyason was the more convinced of the importance of mental tensions, international and domestic. Early in 1941 he was proposing to provide funds for some activity in Australia in this line of study.

By the middle of 1942, technical delays were past and the scheme had matured to a permanent endowment for the study of the Psychology of Conflict. It was to be managed by a Committee of old Australian friends — K. H. Bailey, David Rivett and the writer—with their very tenuous knowledge of the subject-matter stiffened by the addition of Boyce Gibson (further stiffening was to come early in 1947 by Oeser joining the Committee). The way in which funds were to be used was to be decided by the Committee, with Dyason making suggestions and comments. Among his first suggestions were an annual lecture on the lines of the Fisher Lecture, a studentship or an annual prize essay, with publication as a sequel to each of them.

Dyason's aims were developed more fully in subsequent letters and memoranda. The Foundation had no thesis to uphold, no gospel to preach. It was a long-term project and might not reach full stature for twenty years. He hoped to provide additional funds as and when a profitable use for them was established. The object was to advance knowledge and understanding in Australia of the Psychology of Conflict. This object could be pursued by—

- (1) Collection and dissemination of available material.
- (2) Exploration of new lines of country.

The Committee took its time to enquire into possible lines of action and accumulate funds. (Mr. H. E. Bruns of Messrs. Edward Dyason & Co. was very interested and gave valuable help up to his death, when his place was taken by Mr. J. K. Pearson). Finally, it seemed best to begin by some survey of our present knowledge of Conflict, if a competent scholar could be found for this exact-

ing task. There was happily available Dr. Kurt Singer with his encyclopaedic learning in all the social sciences involved, and he was appointed Research Fellow in 1943. Dr. Singer did an immense amount of work in collecting material, laying the foundations of a library of Conflict, and especially, in compiling a critical bibliography of the subject. As a by-product of this study, he produced a number of papers dealing with different aspects of conflict in the past and the present. Some of these have been published in learned journals, but the historical ones were collected into a volume, which M.U.P. issued in 1949, after much recasting and revision, under the title of "The Idea of Conflict".

Dr. Singer resigned in 1946 to take up a position at the University of Sydney. Before that, however, a good deal of thought was given to other possible activities. On the whole it seemed best to try and get wider recognition of the importance of the subject in Universities and generally by getting some eminent authority, preferably a psychologist, to visit Australia and lecture in the capitals. Negotiations were opened and met with a favourable response, but in each case accidents of health or other commitments prevented an immediate visit. Dyason moved to England from Argentina in 1947, and took up the quest of the visiting lecturer with his usual vigour, but for a while with no success.

With no immediate prospect of a visiting lecturer, the Committee turned its attention to the advancement of knowledge, and at the end of 1947 decided to subsidise an enquiry into anti-Semitic tensions in Australia to be carried out at the University of Melbourne under Professor Oeser. This enquiry was made during 1948 and gave very promising data which are still being studied. Publication of results will follow in due course.

This enquiry had some indirect effect in making Australia one of the countries chosen by U.N.E.S.C.O. for an experimental study of international tensions, which is now being carried out under the supervision of Professor Oeser. This is the kind of development which Dyason envisaged. It is hoped that a similar expansion may follow an enquiry into tensions in domestic industry, now in contemplation, which should enlist the interest of employers, unions and governments in a practical approach to the problem of how "real" living standards can be advanced in Australia.

Meanwhile, frustrations continued in the efforts to get an eminent lecturer from overseas, until Dyason made contact with Professor Northrop of Yale and was impressed with his excellence for the purpose. Northrop was able to come in 1949 but unfortugately only for a month. This gave little opportunity for contact

with Universities which was a primary objective, equally with public lectures and contacts with branches of the A.I.I.A. Before Northrop's visit, Dyason had got in touch with Bertrand Russell (Earl Russell) and had interested him in the propect so successfully that he engaged himself for a two months' visit in June this year, which would allow for some substantial work with Universities. The general plan for the visit had been mapped out and agreed upon before Dyason's death.

The Northrop visit was financed by Dyason independently of the Dyason Foundation, and the Committee's only concern was to give advice on details and some general supervision. Dyason had made similar arrangements for the visit of Bertrand Russell, which his Executors are carrying out.

The Foundation will carry on with settled resources on the inspiration of Dyason's vision.

#### Bertrand Russell.

W. Macmabon Ball.

When I agreed to write a short article on Bertrand Russell I did credit, I hope, to my feelings, for I certainly did no credit to my judgment. I felt it was something I would like to do because of the debt I have felt to Russell's writings since they first excited me as a university undergraduate nearly thirty years ago. But from the moment I began to reflect on this assignment I realised that I had taken on something beyond my knowledge and understanding. I know nothing of some of the fields in which Russell has done important work, in mathematical logic, for instance. A good deal of his theory of knowledge eludes me, and when he sometimes abruptly abandons words for mathematical symbols, allegedly in the interests of clarity and precision, I give up the chase. It is reassuring to know that he seldom uses these in his public lectures. Indeed, he distinguishes sharply between logic, which is technical in the same way as mathematics, and philosophy proper, which deals with questions of interest to the general educated public. In his preface to "Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits", published in 1949, Russell explains that he has written the book for a public of this sort. It is an analysis of a number of complex problems, and, except for the section on probability, is intelligible to the layman in philosophy. Those who have not yet read any of Russell's philosophical works, but who may be stimulated to do so by his visit, should, I suggest, begin by reading his essay on "The Uses of Philosophy", written many years ago, but still the best introduction to the study of philosophy I know.

I must not, however, be diverted into making amateurish comments on Russell's philosophy proper. I want rather to try to explain why I feel that his thinking on political and social issues is exceptionally important.

In his political and social writings Russell has been obsessed with a single problem for fifty years. His life has been a ceaseless search for salvation for the individual. It seems to me that the driving

Bertrand Russell (Lord Russell) is to visit Australia this year. His visit has been made possible by the late Mr. E. C. Dyason, whose work for the Institute is commemorated in this issue.—Editor.

force of all his writings in history, politics and education is this deep religious faith that everything else in the world should be used to develop human individuality. "The most important purpose," he wrote in "The Principles of Social Reconstruction", "that political institutions can achieve is to keep alive in individuals creativeness and vigour, vitality and the joy of life . . . What is wanted to keep men full of vitality is opportunity, not only security. Security is merely a refuge from fear; opportunity is the source of hope. The chief use of an economic system is not whether it makes men prosperous, or whether it secures distributive justice, but whether it leaves men's instinctive growth unimpaired."

In describing Russell's starting point as a religious faith I am not perhaps using words in the customary sense. Russell does not accept the theology of any of the great religions. He would be popularly described as a materialist. He states brusquely in "What I Believe" that he believes that when he dies he will rot. Writing more impersonally in "Human Knowledge", he states, "There is no reason to suppose living matter subject to any laws other than those to which inanimate matter is subject, and considerable reason to think that everything in the behaviour of living matter is theoretically explicable in terms of physics and chemistry." In describing his starting point as religious I mean that it is a conviction that has controlled his thought and conduct, and is not demonstrable by any logical or scientific method. This does not, of course, mean that his faith is not real or true. In "Mysticism and Logic", Russell writes that "the opposition of instinct and reason is mainly illusory. Instinct, intuition, or insight is what first leads to the belief which subsequent reason confirms or confutes, but the confirmation, when it is possible, consists in the last analysis of agreement with other beliefs no less instinctive. Reason is a harmonising, controlling force, rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical realm, it is insight that first arrives at what is new." It is in this insight into the supreme value of individual self-realisation that Russell's political and social thought is rooted.

It inspires all his work on the education of children. Russell hardly ever mentions authority, whether in the State, the school or the home without an instinctive shudder. At heart he remains a rebel and an anarchist, but he is a responsible rebel and sophisticated anarchist. He concedes that authority in the education of children is sometimes unavoidable but insists that it must be exercised in accordance with the spirit of liberty. The first and greatest need for the good teacher is reverence for the child. Lack of reverence for the individual child, for his unique capacity for growth and creation, is the root evil of contemporary education.

The teacher without reverence sees children as ignorant and volatile young creatures, and conscientiously proceeds to stock their minds with a fixed syllabus of learning, and to mould their characters to a firm pattern of reliable respectability. But the man with reverence will, in the presence of a child, feel "an unaccountable humility—a humility not easily defensible on any rational ground, and yet somehow nearer to wisdom than the easy self-confidence of many parents and teachers."

This insistence that every institution must be judged by what it does for individual creativeness is Russell's basic belief. He expresses it powerfully in his essay on "Science and Art Under Socialism".

It is this basic faith in the need for individual freedom that gives Russell's political writing its unity and direction. He knows that individuals do not live alone, but as members of society, and that their social relations are not merely adhesions to their personalities, but that individuality can only be developed in and through these social relations. If men are to co-operate they must live in accordance with certain accepted rules, and if these rules are to be effective they must have some authority, even some organised power behind them. Ideally every member of society would gladly and consistently obey these rules, since he would recognise them to be the conditions of his own self-development, the expression of his own real will, not edicts imposed by others. But in practice most individuals will have periods when, through lack of foresight or self-discipline, they will rebel against the rules. Some individuals will refuse to recognise the rules as binding at all, and may conspire to destroy the assumptions on which they are based. Hence the need for authority, for some sanctions for the law. The problem, then, is to reconcile this indispensable authority with individual freedom, to find laws that will control and direct, not suppress and distort, individual initiative and growth. This may mean the reform or even the overthrow of established institutions.

This is not a new problem. It is the problem that has perplexed political thinkers since they began to think. The reconciliation of society and the individual, of law and liberty, has been important for every society and every age. Yet there is perhaps excuse for feeling that it is of peculiar importance to our own generation. If we accept the initial distinction between "Freedom and Organisation", then everywhere we find more organisation and less individual freedom. As the organisations grow in power, they seek more power. They thirst to put a firmer discipline, a wider uniformity on all their members. In party politics the independent has been squeezed out by the party machines, and within the political

parties the caucus discipline is tightening. In the industrial field the trade-unions insist that all wage-earners shall join unions, and then seek to prescribe detailed rules of conduct, the sort of tools to be used, the number of bricks to be laid. Most important of all, the nation state will accept no limits to its sovereign claims. It claims the loyalty and obedience of all its citizens, and insists that national loyalty must override all others. It claims a monopoly in the use of force, the sole right to control soldiers and police. This tendency has gone furthest in what we loosely describe as the authoritarian states, under fascist or soviet control, but is actively growing everywhere, even in America, where nostalgia for the nineteenth century is still widespread. The political ferment among the thousand million people of East Asia is, in one aspect, a movement towards bigger and stronger political organisation. The Asians are subordinating loyalty to the family or clan to a wider loyalty to the nation. The family group had, of course, always imposed a discipline on its members, but it was a discipline which could be sympathetically adapted to particular circumstances and individual needs. The state cannot afford the same elasticity in the laws it enacts, or permit the same discretion in their administration. The bigger and more complex the society, the greater the need for organisation and authority. In international life there is the same movement from variety and freedom, to cohesion and organisation. After the First World War there were eight great powers, and each had distinctive interests and aims. Since the Second World War there are only two great powers, and the rest of the world's peoples are tending to become assimilated to one or the other, and to accept, with whatever reluctance, the ultimate authority of either Washington or Moscow.

It is not merely that social organisations have become vast towering structures, in which individuals are embedded like grains of sand in concrete. It is that those who hold political power today hold physical power on a scale undreamed of a generation ago. The aeroplane, the guided missile, the atomic or hydrogen bomb, the techniques of biological warfare; these all add to the power of the state, or at least of the two great states. It seems that all they can do for the individual is to blast him to a final oblivion.

It is in this world, so ominous and impersonal, that Bertrand Russell insists we must reconcile individual freedom and social organisation. He knows that this problem of the right relation between individual and society is not something that can be resolved once for all. It has to be resolved in a different way by each generation. The relations between an individual and his society are not

static, deductible from the unchanging nature of society and individuality. They are constantly changing. The progress of physical science has been a prime cause of these changes. When a nation adopts new machines, new methods of industrial production, new techniques of warfare, it transforms social relations. In these last years the physical scientists have discovered and invented new machines which have hit the individual and society with a stunning impact. We have not yet found how to control this impact. And if we do not learn it soon, it may not only stun, but destroy us. The problem is how to change our political methods and reshape our political habits quickly enough to keep pace with the changes which the physical scientist produces in our social relations each time he puts some new physical power in our hands.

Russell is sometimes charged with inconstancy in his political views. He is teased for the enthusiasm he showed for Guild Socialism in the early twenties, a form of socialist doctrine now out of fashion. He is taunted for inconstancy in his teaching on war. During the First World War he was a conscientious objector. Throughout the 1930's he was preaching militant pacifism. At the end of "Which Way to Peace", first published in 1936, he wrote that "the duty of every friend of mankind, of any man who cares for any aspect of civilised life" was simple and clear. It was "to abstain from fighting, and from all voluntary participation in war between civilised states; to use every effort to persuade others to do likewise; to bring all possible influence to bear to prevent the participation of his country in war; and, within the limits of his capacity, to aim at similar results in other countries also." Yet, when war came in 1939, Russell did all in his power to help the war effort.

For my part I can see no basic inconsistencies in the progress of Russell's political thought. He has never, so far as I know, taught that war or that socialism was right or wrong in the absolute sense; only that, in a particular set of circumstances, the available evidence indicated that a particular kind of war would be bad, or a particular kind of socialism good. This is not to say that Russell has not made serious mistakes of judgment. It is easy to show that he has, for he has himself been eager to acknowledge and correct them. In politics it is often necessary to make immediate judgments; they must be made in the light of the available evidence, never complete. It is not inconsistent to change those judgments in the light of new evidence. Russell always made it clear that his pacifism was based on empirical evidence, not on moral or religious absolutes. Hitler provided a good deal of new evidence between 1936 and

1939. I have a personal interest in the changes of Russell's views on war, since I was a pacifist in the middle thirties for exactly the reasons that he put forward. It was only after I had gone as an observer with Hitler's army when it invaded the Sudetenland and made a visit to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp that my views changed. Russell has been condemned in leftist circles for some criticisms he has recently made of political methods in the Soviet Union. This criticism, so far as I know, is a consistent expression of the principles he set forth in "The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism" in 1920. It is simply that a good deal of new evidence has flowed in since then.

I will not try to predict what Russell will say about authority and freedom in his Australian lectures. I am sure he will not repeat the prescriptions he wrote in 1930 or 1910, but will produce fresh prescriptions for the different circumstances and graver maladies of 1950. I am sure that his lectures will be both detached and passionate; passionate in their awareness of the dignity of man, detached in their appraisal of the ways and means by which his dignity can be guarded and enriched.

## Indonesia (Part 2.)

Harry J. Benda.

There can be no doubt that the defeat of Holland at the hands of the Germans resulted in a loss of Dutch prestige which could only be answered by a preparedness to grant wider concessions still and this preparedness increased when the Pacific War broke out. In the final analysis, every colonial power, however much accepted or resisted, rests on the indubitable factor of armed force. However small the standing army may be, it yet represents a solid wall of European rule which, before the last War, or perhaps more correctly, before the period of Nazi aggression, seemed indestructible in the East. And we may anticipate here and say quite frankly that the emergence of Holland on the side of the vicors in 1945 did not mean that the Indonesians were convinced of a victory of the Dutch armies. Indeed, it can hardly be interpreted as such. Anyone in Dutch Government circles in London was fully aware of the changed situation which had been brought about by the exile of the Queen and later on by the loss of the overseas territories in the East. Queen Wilhelmina in a memorable broadcast in March, 1942, outlined an entirely new conception of the Dutch Empire to emerge after an allied victory. The centralised form of government, according to her statement, would be replaced by a co-partnership of three equal members of the Empire: the Dutch West Indies, Holland proper, and Indonesia. This statement of far-reaching importance in 1942 was unfortunately practically unknown in Indonesia. It presented a singularly wise piece of political planning and could have served well as a basis for postwar negotiations.

The armed forces of the Netherlands East Indies after a brief and heroic struggle of the Navy and Air Force and a briefer still, and most ineffectual, defence by the Army, surrendered unconditionally to the Japanese. At that time the Europeans were quite unaware of the far-reaching effects this Japanese victory would have on them or on the Indonesian population. In fact, the country had largely been run by its European population numbering some 250,000 people all told; included in this latter group must be all the so-called Indo-Europeans or half-castes who numbered more

than 200,000. All the key positions in the administration were occupied by whites, and in addition to this all commerce and all public utility works such as electricity works, the railways and gas companies, for example, were exclusively manned by Europeans in key positions.

Now, as Java had not had a scheme of general conscription and therefore did actually not possess a sufficiently large army, it was obvious that defence of the island could not have been very effective; the Indonesians, on the other hand, had never seen a realisation of their demands for a native militia. Conversely, this state of affairs meant that when the Europeans were called up for military service, more than half of the male European population was withdrawn from the economic and administrative apparatus of the country. The remaining European men were those only who had been considered of extreme importance to the smooth functioning of the whole machinery, but even from this body, men were still called up for auxiliary services. The net result of the Dutch surrender was, therefore, that some 65,000 Dutchmen became prisoners of war. It was generally held among Europeans that the Japanese would have but one course open to them if they wanted to retain Java on its level of productivity for the pursuance of the war: viz. a very short-term release of all their European prisoners who would then be sent back to their jobs. Without them, it was thought, Java could not be run and it would soon fall into disrepair, economically speaking. To the Japanese, of course, the economic importance of Java was strictly limited; whereas to Holland the export commodities had been of prime importance, to the Japanese only such commodities were thought worthy of production as would help to increase the Japanese war potential. Among these commodities they of course included oil, rubber, zinc, to mention but a few, while on the other hand there was no need to continue the cultivation of sugar, tea, coffee, and so forth. Consequently tea plantations, for instance, were either abandoned or converted into tapioca or rice fields, in both cases with the disastrous result of reducing the tea production of Java for many years to come. The same can be said of sugar, where out of a total of some seventy odd sugar mills, only some ten were kept in production. Thus the Japanese could already dispense with quite a number of European technical personnel, such as engineers and supervisors, without finding it any more difficult to run Java. After the prisoners of war had been interned and to some degree transported to other territories, Japanese attention was focussed on the large body of European civil servants. There again it had been thought that when these men were removed, the governmental machinery would collapse and give way to anarchy, but the Japanese interned all civil servants and replaced them, as far as the very key positions were concerned, by their own people; for the less important positions, by Indonesians.

Whatever may be said of Japanese rule with its wanton use of force and its ruthlessness, it cannot be denied that on the whole the governmental machinery functioned, even if we admit that it functioned much less efficiently than it had before. Of course, one should realise that the Japanese were handicapped by the war and a Military Administration, and did not really think in terms of a peacetime Civil Service. By the time the European civil servants had been interned it started to dawn on the Dutch that the Japanese meant business. Far from realising that Europeans were indispensable, they seemed bent on putting into action their ideas of excluding them from all walks of life. Before the Europeans had had time to adjust themselves to this unpleasant truism they had been removed and interned. It is difficult to over-emphasize the importance of this event. On the one hand Europeans who had been used to a life of comparative luxury and ease, were hurled from preeminence into utter subjection. On the other hand, as far as the Indonesians were concerned, the myth of white superiority had found its sudden and irrevocable end. However fully the Whites realised the first of these two statements, they failed at the time, and many of them still fail now, to see the implications of the second. Once and for all it was proven that a European could be ordered around, that he could be deprived of all the vestiges of civilised life, that he could be made to work under appalling conitions, that he could be starved—and all that by Asiatics. On the whole, the treatment meted out to Europeans by the Japanese can in no way be compared in severity to that which the Germans applied to their victims. (This does not apply to P.O.W.'s interned by the Germans, who were, by and large, treated in accordance with international rules, which Japan completely disregarded. The comparison is made between German concentration camps and Japanese internment camps for civilians.) If we disregard the unfortunate minority of people who have come in contact with the Japanese Kempeitai (Military Police), we may say that, however appalling conditions were in internment camps throughout Java. they did not amount to wholesale slaughter or even to wholesale maltreatment. Internment of course was a terrible burden, especially to the women, who had to see their children deprived of food and had to live under conditions which could only be described as pitiable. The withholding of adequate food in a land of plenty was, psychologically speaking, the most cruel part of internment. Add to these measures the nervous strain of uncertainty, irritability, and apprehension, and the situation will be understood.

We shall now proceed to a brief summary of the Indonesian as-

pect of the Japanese occupation.

In reviewing the attitude of the Indonesian population towards the Japanese, it will be necessary critically to discuss the accusation of collaboration among the Indonesians. Much has been made of this accusation, especially in the first years of the Republic's existence, and it is undoubtedly true that the declaration of independence and the proclamation of the Republic followed closely the Japanese surrender. It is equally true that the men who proclaimed the Republic had been the mouth-piece of an Indonesia created by the Japanese during the war. But the point surely arises whether these people, and especially men like Dr. Sukarno and Dr. Hatta, were collaborators in the sense that a Quisling was in Europe. European collaborators were people who profited from the defeat of their own country and collaborated with the enemy often to the detriment of their fatherland but invariably in their own interests. No such clear-cut indictment could ever be levelled against the Indonesian leaders. They and their people had no struggle against the Japanese who were invading a Dutch colony. If they had hoped to improve their own status and the share which their people would be granted under Japanese rule in the Government of their land, they were fully entitled to prefer collaboration with the "victors" to loyalty to the former overlords who had not even given them the necessary military means and training of resistance. It is quite easy to find parallels to this development in the First World War, when e.g. many nationalist leaders of the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy openly joined forces with the allies. The sole reason why this argument has cropped up in the present instances is that unfortunately for the Indonesians they had joined forces with the losing side. Japanese collaboration meant to many of the Indonesian intellectuals a possibility to advance one step further on the road to self-government and in this supposition they were by and large justified. It would be absurd to claim that they took an active anti-allied stand and willingly increased the Japanese war potential. Japanese war aims were to them quite immaterial and it may be doubted whether, after 1943, any one of them believed in ultimate Japanese victory. On the contrary, it was the very decline of the Japanese war fortunes which enabled them to press further their insistent claims for wider participation in the Government.

It is significant that many exiled Indonesian leaders had been approached by the Dutch Government on the eve of its evacuation from Java, to accompany the Dutch officials to Australia, there to form the core of a new administrative apparatus. Many of them accepted this invitation, but to some it had been extended so late that the very rapid advance of the Japanese prevented their evacuation in time. It is equally true that other Indonesian intellectuals asked to go with the government abroad, for fear of Japanese punishment for their former Communist leanings and activities. As this evacuation was not always successful, there remained a good many of these political leaders in Java, and several of them-though by no means all (exceptions were, e.g. Sutan Shahrir and Dr. Sharifuddin) "collaborated" with the Japanese. The Japanese found that in their own interests they had to grant some-initially only nominal-participation in the Government of the country, and whatever their objectives may have been, the Indonesian leaders clearly saw and exploited every possibility of gaining from them posts in the administration and a betterment in the political educaton of their people generally. This education was taken in hand at a rate hitherto unknown in Indonesia. Newspapers mushroomed, although strictly supervised by the Japanese, and they contributed very largely to an awakening political responsibility, or at least awareness among broad mases of Indonesians.

It is certainly true to say that literacy advanced by leaps and bounds in the four years of Japanese rule, although this does not mean that some 40 million Indonesians in Java became literate overnight, as it were. Hand in hand with the spread of literacy went a very determined policy of Japanisation, and an equally determined policy of eradicating traces of Europeanisation, and Dutch influences in particular, from the country. For instance, the use of the English and Dutch languages was severely prohibited. Japanese and Indonesian became the official languages. The Indonesian language is Malay, with a good many foreign—mostly Dutch—words assimilated to it, which the Dutch Government long ago considered to be the ideal lingua franca of inter-racial communication in those vast territories. It has, since 1942, increased in popularity and has now officially become the national language of the new Federal Republic.

Japanese political propaganda was, of course, mainly concerned with Japan's own war aims. Slogans such as "The Asiatic Co-Prosperity Sphere" rivalled slogans demonstrating Allied inferiority; but one can easily dismiss this type of slogan for the only one which is of any permanence. It is the dictum "Asia for the Asia-

tics", coined, it is true, a very long time ago by Dr. Sun Yat Sen, but popularised only in the years 1942 to 1945. This will stick in the minds of the whole Far East, whether or not it has undergone Japanese occupation. Another equally important aspect of Japanese rule was its utter disregard for the fabric of social life which the Dutch had been careful in maintaining as far as possible. Independence of Native States, for instance, meant nothing to the Japanese, and to the social disturbances which had already followed in the wake of the plantation system, there were added such features as large-scale forced labour, huge deportations of native labour to adjacent islands or further away still, and the creation, or rather the increase of, an already existing very small city proletariat.

Lastly, we must mention also the active vehicles of political propaganda which centred mainly in Youth Organisations, most of them, like the "Pemuda", armed organisations not entirely dissimilar to the German Hitler Youth. There were also huge conscript armies of Indonesians which were often employed by the Japanese overseas, and to some extent also as auxiliary guards for the European prison camps. The following four conclusions may be drawn from the preceding exposition.

Firstly, the creation of Youth organisations, auxiliary troops and a city proletariat would create a great mass of politically more mature people than Indonesia had ever known before.

Secondly, for the first time in the history of Java masses of her people had been taught to use weapons of modern warfare (even including a few pilots), and this was a lesson not easily unlearned. That young men, steeped in political irrationalism, were armed with automatic weapons, could in the end only lead to disastrous disturbances in many instances.

Thirdly, it is not unimportant to note that the employment of native troops in guarding European prisoners left a very bitter mark on most European minds. The average European thought, however ridiculous this may seem, that the Indonesians should have been thankful to him for his good government, and oppose the

Japanese who had treated the Europeans so badly.

Fourthly and lastly, such measures as enforced conscription and large scale deportations could do little to make the Japanese very popular in the long run. In effect, antagonism was fairly widespread, and it even sometimes resulted in open riot; but it was a great mistake of the Dutch to interpret this anti-Nippon feeling as a preparedness again to accept Dutch rule, after the war. The only real effect of the resistance against the Japanese was, of course, a further growth of political maturity. It has been one of the

gravest political errors of the European community as a whole to misinterpret this state of affairs at the beginning; as a groundwork for Dutch governmental policy it proved to be tragic.

When the Japanese knew that their defeat was imminent, they granted full independence to Indonesia, but this state of affairs had been gradually prepared in the preceding months; so it came about that Dr. Sukarno proclaimed the Indonesian Republic in August, 1945, in full agreement with Viscount Terauchi, Japanese Commander, South East Asia, It was then this Republic which claimed sovereignty over the whole former Dutch territory which confronted the Allies on their entry into Java. The South East Asia Command had at the last minute, before the Japanese surrender, been entrusted with the re-occupation of Indonesia by the Supreme Allied Command, and the resultant reshuffle of naval forces made it impossible to occupy Java as quickly as might have been desirable. There existed, consequently, a sort of political vacuum when the Japanese were still in actual command, but had abdicated in favour of the Indonesian Republic. Some of their arms had been openly handed over to Indonesian soldiers. Other army stocks were taken over by the Indonesians, sometimes with the use of considerable force, from the Japanese. Lord Louis Mountbatten, unable to occupy Java quickly, entered into negotiations with Dr. Sukarno, which actually amounted to a de facto recognition of the young State.

The reasons for this recognition were quite easily discernible. The British, as representatives of the United Nations, had two tasks to fulfil in Java. Firstly, they had to disarm, intern and eventually repatriate the huge enemy military forces centred in that area, and, secondly, they had to liberate and rehabilitate about 250,000 P.O.W.'s and civilian internees, spread in camps all over the island. It was impossible to achieve either aim without the active cooperation of the only administrative organs which functioned in Java at the time, and these were the officials paying allegiance to the new Republic governed by Dr. Sukarno. Much blame has been laid at the door of the British in acquitting themselves of these very intricate and delicate tasks, but their position was certainly far from enviable. On the one hand, they were allies of the Dutch, who were as yet the only internationally recognised sovereign power of the area, and the British had pledged themselves to ultimate transfer of the Indies to the Netherlands. On the other hand, they could not afford to press this point too much, for the simple reason that neither their own armed forces nor those of the Dutch allowed of immediate implementation of Dutch claims. Nor was it easy

for the British blatantly to offend Indonesian nationalism, wherever it may have sprung from, in the face of their own very delicate negotiations with India. A substantial part of the British armed forces used in Java were recruited from Indian troops and it was clearly undesirable, to let animosities, let alone armed conflict, spring up between Indians and Indonesians. Nor were the Indonesians slow in grasping the situation and appealing to their Asiatic brethren "across the lines". To the Dutch the *de facto* recognition of the Sukarno régime was a severe blow, amounting almost to treason.

One of the many factors which played an almost tragically important part in those first years was the almost complete isolation of Indonesia from the outside world. No news of internal developments reached allied intelligence officers and, more important still, the Netherlands East Indies' authorities in Australia. They had planned the reconstruction of the territories in question very minutely, had built up a corps of civil servants, some of them Indonesians, in Australia, and had also taken broad measures for the coming economic reconstruction of the islands. Although we do not know just how far their plans had envisaged wider participation and democratisation of the government, one may safely assume that all such plans were based on Queen Wilhelmina's broadcast of March, 1942, and were thus aimed at a gradual widening of local participation in the administration. The Dutch failed initially to distinguish between what was truly nationalistic and what was purely Japanese in the new set-up and they were at a perfect loss to comprehend the open hostility which greeted their arrival in the wake of the British in Java. They failed for a long time to understand that the speed of political reformation and concessions was to be set, not by them, but by the Indonesians themselves, and it is true to say that until very recently Dutch policy was at least one step behind actual reality.

In order fully to understand this very complex situation it is not enough to record, however faithfully, the political concessions which gradually were granted at The Hague and which have now led to this final solution. By far the most deep-rooted cleavage which has kept the two sides for so long apart was of a psychological rather than of a political nature. It is undeniable that the Dutch were excellent colonizers, but it is equally undeniable that with all that they were still colonizers, and that had meant an implied if not outspoken white superiority and a corresponding and often outspoken inferiority of the native races. This is the reason why claims of a political nature tended to be regarded by the authorities and most Europeans in general alike as a purely irreden-

tistic phenomena, which could be disregarded or silenced by force. On the other hand, among the intellectual Indonesians there had remained from pre-War times a deep distrust in the sincerity of Dutch promises and the two successive 'police actions' seemed to have exhausted any possibility of a peaceful settlement. Now that this settlement has become a political reality, it will be necessary, if its success is to be of a lasting nature, to ensure something in the nature of a psychological revolution. The Dutch and Eurasian will now have to realise that the new political entity has given their Indonesian fellow-citizens complete and internationally recognised equality with them, and moreover political sovereignty. The Indonesians, again, will have to acknowledge that the Dutch have acted generously at last and that the time has come to regard them as old friends, whose technical and economic co-operation in Indonesia is, for the next few years at least, essential. This psychological revolution will have to proceed in the face of great difficulties. No one can expect an immediate and smooth working of the Indonesian Federation, for the simple reason that it has not enough trained and experienced personnel; moreover, it still contains many elements of an extremist character who have been given almost a free hand in the unsettled conditions of the last four years. It is these very elements which have so often endangered the life of the new Republic from its very beginnings to the Communist revolt of last year. It is these elements, too, which have so often served as a pretext for Dutch unwillingness to negotiate with the Republic any further. But there can be little doubt that on the whole the Republic has been able to consolidate its position against all internal attacks and that it has come to stand for the symbol of Indonesian unity. It has been the most powerful spring of the new enthusiasm which has grasped these islands. To the force of this symbol the Dutch had to bow, and its magnitude can most clearly be measured by this very fact.

Let us finally briefly review the steps which have led to the final agreement, before we outline the general terms of that agreement itself. From an original stolid refusal to negotiate with the Republic at all, the Dutch had gradually been forced to recognise it as a political reality. This cost much persuasion, both in Batavia and, more particularly, at The Hague. It should also be mentioned that the assistance of mediators, in particular British ones, has played a successful part in the early negotiations. While the Republic had originally claimed sovereignty over the total area of former Netherlands East Indies, it could not for any length of time maintain this claim. When the first Dutch-Indonesian agreement, the

so-called Lingadiati agreement, was signed in March, 1947, the Republic was de facto recognised by the Netherlands, but its area was limited to Java, Madura and Sumatra. In all the other parts of the former Island Empire the Dutch had regained sufficient military and economic control to create local Governments more in line with their own plans of gradual transfer of political power. The plans for a federation had already emerged at an early date and the Dutch, to counterbalance the exclusive claims of the Republic, had created two semi-independent states, one in Borneo and the other comprising Celebes and the lesser Sunda Isles under the name of East Indonesia. The social ramifications of these new states were closely allied to their political importance: very limited political power in these areas tended to be given by the Dutch to the old feudal nobility, in an endeavour to use them as a brake against the intellectual middle-class Republicans who had spread radical nationalism beyond Java and Sumatra. When negotiations with the Republic became less and less fruitful and finally broke down the Dutch envisaged the creation of a United States of Indonesia which could be formed, if need be, with the exclusion of the Republicans. The main reason for the breakdown of Dutch-Republican negotiations lay in the hotly disputed question of sovereignty. The Republicans were unwilling to cede the sovereignty title under whatever clauses to the Dutch Crown or to a temporary body in which the Dutch would retain the power to veto. They wished to maintain their status and with it such internationl representation as they had already established, e.g. in Egypt, in Australia and at Lake Success. In point of fact the Lingadjati Agreement did, in its famous Article 8, contain a clause in which the Republic was prepared at least formally to recognise the Crown as being sovereign. But the whole agreement was full of loopholes for different interpretations and finally nothing came of its implementation. When the Dutch resorted to force in December, 1947, the Indonesians claimed that they were no longer bound by that clause. With the 'police action' of 1947, however, Indonesia ceased to be once and for all an internal affair of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Dutch delegate, it is true, never failed to voice his Government's unwillingness to accept the intervention of the Security Council. This intervention was nevertheless an established fact, even although it was not backed by military force. The Security Council's "cease-fire" order stopped the first military action in Java. A United Nations Good Offices Committee was despatched to Java to facilitate the resumption of negotiations; it consisted of one American, one Australian and one Belgian member. In the Renville Agreement a new basis had been formed on which it was hoped both parties would be able to proceed further towards an ultimate solution. But again the vexing problem of a short-term transfer of sovereignty stood in the way of this outcome at the time. The Dutch had by that time occupied the strategically most important points on the coast line of the Republic and their naval supremacy could enforce a virtual blockade of Republican territory. With meagre resources and a very reduced territory, the Republican leaders still strove to maintain their original claims. The second police action in June, 1948, again brought forward Security Council intervention and the reports of the Good Offices Committee in Batavia were outspokenly critical of this Dutch action. However, the Dutch achieved their military objectives with astonishing success. The Republican capital was occupied and the leaders interned on the island of Banka. The Republic, so it seemed, had ceased to exist. It was the last and most desperate effort to achieve a solution of this complex problem by the use of superior forces, based on the mistaken belief that the Republic was nothing but the crea-

tion of a handful of irresponsible extremists.

It can be seen in retrospect that the Dutch success was a truly Pyrrhic victory. World opinion had decidedly swung against them and, what is perhaps more important still, those parts of Indonesia which had been given semi-autonomy under Dutch rule now also came quite openly into disagreement with Batavia. It is interesting to notice how forceful these factors had become although no armed intervention was ever used to deprive the Dutch of their military success. Already in June, 1949, Dutch forces were ordered to withdraw from Diociakarta. The Republican leaders had to be released and returned to their capital. The last act of the Drama was about to be enacted, and two noticeable steps proceeded it. First all Indonesian groups, Republican and outside the Republic, coalesced in July, 1949. Two conferences were held in Indonesia during which almost complete unity of aims and demands was established. If the Dutch had ever hoped to play off one group of Indonesian rulers against another this hope had to be buried. Secondly, at the Conference which was to meet at the Dutch capital, United Nations mediators were to be permanently present in order to offer their intervention whenever the need might arise. When the Round Table Conference met at The Hague it was realised that failure to reach agreement there and then on the basic issues would forfeit for good the chances of a peaceful settlement in Java. One should not forget that the repeated military actions of the Dutch had played into the hands of those extremist groups in Java who argued very forcefully against resumption of any negotiations with the Dutch. It is to be admired that against this troubled background and with their own recent and bitter experiences of imprisonment the Indonesian leaders in the Republic were able to persuade their followers of the necessity of further talks in The Hague. What is more admirable still is the unprecedented rise from military defeat to political predominance which these leaders have recently experienced. When the Indonesian delegation arrived at The Hague, the framework for Indonesia was more or less decided upon. Instead of forming the United States of Indonesia, as planned in 1947, there is to come into being the Republik Indonesia Sarekat (The Federal Republic of Indonesia) in which happy name the element of the federal idea is wedded to the recognition of the original Republican ideal. Predominance in the negotiations on the Indonesian side has indubitably gone to the Republican leaders; it is expected that they will occupy the highest posts in the new Federation as soon as it comes into being. After spending millions of pounds and sending scores of thousands of soldiers to Indonesia, the Netherlands have now had to agree to transfer full and unrestricted sovereignty to the Federation before the end of 1949. The Federal Republic will only be linked by the symbol of the Crown to the Kingdom of the Netherlands and it can clearly be seen that this constitutional solution was closely modelled on the status which the new India will shortly occupy in the Commonwealth of Nations. The Federal Republic will have its own diplomatic representation and will have the full control of its own finance and economy. Furthermore, the Netherlands have had to agree to withdraw all their military personnel at the shortest possible time, the bulk of it within 6 months. A compromise solution has been found for the naval base at Sourabaya, while the question of the status of the Netherlands' part of New Guinea will be subsequently decided upon. While it is simple to emphasize the pressure which recent developments in Asia, and more particularly perhaps the Communist victories in China, may have exercised on the reversal of Dutch policy, one cannot fail to pay homage to the wise statesmanship which, after so many errors, has decided to trust at last in good will and co-operation rather than in the use of force. While it is as yet too early unreservedly to rejoice at the complete elimination of all friction in this strategically and economically so important region, one may reasonably assume that the road should now be clear towards a lessening of political tension in Indonesia. This development will be greeted by the whole world with relief, and it will be especially welcomed by Indonesia's close neighbours in the adjacent Asiatic countries no less than in Australia and New Zealand.

# Political Developments in the Middle East.

Paul Freadman.

On January 29th, 1949, after the Palestine war had been fought out between the Jews and the Arabs, and British prestige in the Middle East appeared at its lowest ebb, the House of Commons debated the Government's Palestine policy. Mr. Bevin, defending that policy, said:

"It was in Arab countries that the Eighth Army was based and equipped, and without the help the Arabs freely gave us, I doubt whether the North African Campaign could have been fought and won . . . If we

had lost the Suez Canal, we might have lost the war."

Some qualifications may be in order concerning this appraisal of the role of the Arab communities in the second World War: nevertheless the admission is here of the persistent dependence of Western security on the Arab bloc. Notwithstanding the range of opinion and criticism expressed in the debate by later speakers, this point was not disputed. It is, in fact, the clue to an explanation of the development of the policies of the West in this region in the post-war years.

The most publicised conflicts of the Middle East since 1945 were those in Iran, 1945-6, when the Northern provinces were in revolt, and Palestine, 1948-49. Unrest, however, was much more general than these two examples alone would indicate. Iraq, early in 1948, was in a near-revolutionary state following an unsuccessful British attempt to secure a new alliance with the country; Syria has seen a series of three coups d'etat since the French withdrawal in 1946; there has been acute social tension in Egypt accompanied by an aggressive external policy towards England, centering on demands for revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. Social unrest, political immaturity, the war in Palestine, and nationalism strongly tinged throughout with anti-West feeling, have promoted instability in most of the countries of the Middle East. This was heightened by the decline of British and French strength in the post-war world generally, and in this region specifically.

The reaction of the West, particularly of Britain, has been to

make far-reaching attempts to restore both the stability of the area, and the predominance of Western influence throughout it. It is proposed to examine the main events connected with that process over the past few years. Such an analysis, however, should be prefaced by a review of three important background factors: Western relations with the Middle East countries between the two world wars, the problem of Arab unity, the social and economic conditions prevailing throughout the Arab states.

Considering these in turn: it is now a matter for history that there was considerable hostility among the Arabs themselves over the status determined for the Middle East countries by the major powers after World War I. Promises of independence made in the McMahon correspondence with Sharif Husain of Mecca, were not kept. The old Greater Persia claimed by Husain for his Arab kingdom was split to yield four separate mandated territories; this arrangement accommodated British and French interests in the regions. The dual obligation to Arabs and Jews in Palestine, under the terms of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and subsequently of the mandate there, produced intermittent conflict which was resolved ultimately by war in 1948. During the twenty-one years between the two World Wars, Britain and France, as mandatories, made some attempt to meet the demands of the leaders of the Middle East states for independence. In the case of Britain, treaties in 1930 and 1936 with Iraq and Egypt respectively recognised the independence of these countries. Britain also sponsored the entry of both into the League of Nations. But the treaties contained exceptional provisions for defence facilities for the former mandatory power in the territory of the Middle East country; the fact that the West continued to impose such conditions yielded further friction. France proposed similar treaties for Syria and Lebanon in 1936, then failed to ratify them. In Palestine, no such move was made at all. There were further grounds for discontent. When World War II broke out, Britain had to take military action to cope with defections in Iraq and Syria and to forestall another in Egypt. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem found his way to Berlin and then broadcast to the Arab lands urging them to revolt. The only Middle East state which proved to be wholly dependable, from the point of view of the West, was Transjordan. Mr. Bevin notwithstanding, a leading British officer of the Middle East, Brigadier Glubb Pasha, had this to say of Arab assistance to the Western cause:

"At the time of these operations, every Arab was perfectly convinced that Britain was finished forever . . . the Iraquis were perfectly sure of this or they would not have declared war on us . . . Every Arab force pre-

viously organised by us mutinied and refused to fight for us or faded away in desertions."1

The problem of Arab unity may be viewed against this background of strained relations. Western diplomacy was not the only factor responsible for the absence of unity in the Middle East after World War I. Dynastic and other cleavages between the countries concerned also contributed. Ibn Sa'ud opposed and defeated Husain's forces in battle and went on to consolidate the kingdom of Saudi Arabia over the regions of Nejd and Hejaz.<sup>2</sup> Egypt was not envisaged as part of Husain's domain. This situation, plus the fragmentation imposed by the mandates system produced a series of weak, mutually suspicious and separate states in the Middle East which persist to this day.

Despite the foregoing, it has been one aspect of British policy to protest support for Arab unity throughout the Middle East. Mr. Anthony Eden announced in 1941 that His Majesty's Government would give full support to any scheme commanding general approval, in the direction of greater unity. In 1945, the separate states of Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, Lebanon, and Egypt signed the Charter of a new Arab League whose purpose was to promote co-operation generally among the signatories, and collaboration in the organisation of political plans. Mr. Richard Law, Secretary of State, expressed the British Government's pleasure at the formation of the League, in the House of Commons on May 9th, 1945.4

Stimulated by the Palestine conflict, some degree of co-ordinated effort emerged under the auspices of the Arab League, but it has since foundered badly on two rocks. The first was the defeat of the several Arab armies, in the Palestine war, with the exception of the Abdullah's Arab Legion. The second has been the renewed political drive by Abdullah, in the midst of this military collapse, for the realisation of the Greater Syria plan which he inherits from his father, Sharif Husain of Mecca. He has taken a concrete step recently in this direction by annexing adjacent Arab Palestine to his Kingdom of Jordan. The Greater Syria plan was denounced by Syria and Egypt in 1948, and at the instigation of Egypt, the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine announced the formation of an opposition Arab 'government' in Gaza, which was promptly re-

Appendix to "The Golden Carpet" by Somerset de Chair, pp. 214-15. The Times, 4/3/45, gave figures to show that 21,000 out of a total of 29,000 enlistments from the Middle East countries were Jews.

<sup>2.</sup> Seton-Williams: "Britain and the Arab States," pp. 183-189.

<sup>3.</sup> Cmd. 6,289, quoted Seton-Williams, p. 221.

<sup>4.</sup> Seton-Williams, p. 226. Yemen was also a foundation League member and is so still, although the Yemen delegate was not present when the Charter was signed.

<sup>5.</sup> Announced 24/4/50.

cognised by Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. At this moment, fellow members of the League are threatening Abdullah with the

application of sanctions.6

Effective unity among the Arab states has thus so far failed to emerge, but the consequences of this to the West are various and may be only partly unsatisfactory at the present time. On the debit side is the fact that lack of unity prejudices the security of the region from a military point of view and is, as we shall see, detrimental to the progress of economic developmental plans on which the stability of the entire region may depend. On the other hand, the absence of a united front weakens effective opposition to Western influence, despite the fact that antagonism to that same influence persists. Individual states are more susceptible to promises of support and assistance under these circumstances than they might otherwise be. In fact Britain has contrived to benefit from the immediate situation by consolidating her position with Jordan. She may yet succeed, also, in making a deal with Egypt in light of that country's military eclipse.

The third major factor in the situation is the backwardness of social and economic conditions prevailing throughout the Middle East lands. Except for the coastal regions of Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, and limited areas about the main waterways, the Middle East lands are arid. Productivity throughout is low, agricultural techniques are backward, industrialisation is in the main lacking, and, despite advances during the second World War, labour movements appear to remain weak. The result is an overall low standard of living which is particularly acute in certain areas. Two of these, Egypt and Iraq have been cited recently. In Egypt,  $3\frac{1}{2}\%$  of the land, which alone is regarded as cultivatable, has to sustain a population which has risen from 9 millions to 17 millions over the last fifty years. The plight of the Egyptian peasant hase been revealed in these words:

"(His) allotment grows smaller and smaller, obsolete methods of cultivation persist, and a rock bottom decline is reached with an agricultural population, disease-ridden and drowned in debt, living on an average per

capita income of £5 annually."

In Iraq, where by contrast, rich natural resources are known to exist, the population is too small, and methods again inadequate to exploit them. It has been estimated that 80% of the population live below annual subsistence level of £12 per head; Iraq has an infant mortality of 60%, and an expectation of life of 27.

<sup>6.</sup> B.B.C. News, 21/5/50; Aust. Jewish Herald 28/4/50, p. 1.

<sup>7.</sup> Infra.

Eban: "Some Social and Cultural Problems of the Middle East"—International Affairs, Vol. XXIII., No. 3. July '47, pp. 372-3.

This situation is due partly to a fundamental factor, the restricted basis of land ownership. In Egypt, a limited number of wealthy proprietors employ half the farm population as labourers; in Iraq, the bulk of the population is employed on onerous terms as share tenants; in Syria, there exists a large class of landless workers or sub-landed peasants. The general picture is one of disproportionate holdings on the one hand and exploitation on the other. Attempted reform in the past has come up against this existing social structure and the interests which benefit from it. Those interests, moreover, are closely allied with the military cliques which have been fostered by the West, and which, through their economic power, contrive to manipulate the reins of government in most of the Middle East countries.

Arising from this situation there are again many consequences affecting the position of the West in the Middle East. The most obvious one is that there is a real danger of social revolution. The crisis in Iraq in 1948 was closely connected with acute food shortages, and one writer has expressed the view that most of the elements involved in a revolution conforming to the Leninist model were present in the country at that time. 10 A second consequence, of great importance politically, is that the Arab ruling classes are violently anti-Communist. After the revolt of the Northern provinces of Iran in 1946, the Iranian government outlawed the Tudeh party and a meeting of Arab leaders took place at King Farouk's palace at Inchass; as a result of this, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Transjordan took similar action.11 The Communist party, although never strong, is outlawed to-day in every country of the Middle East except Israel. This state of affairs may commend itself to the West on certain grounds, but it also means that in the absence of strong social policies which hitherto have been lacking, the West is in danger of backing reactionary regimes throughout the region.

The first thorough-going attempt to come to grips with the basic economic problems of the Middle East was made during the second World War. Under British, and later Anglo-American auspices, the Middle East Supply Centre was set up to try and make the Middle East an economically self-sufficient area. This agency was not continued or replaced when the war emergency passed, but three final reports were presented to the Director General of

See Doreen Warriner: "Land and Poverty in the Middle East" for full treatment of this topic; also H. A. R. Gibb, "The Future of Arab Unity," in Harris Foundation Lectures, 1942.

Kimche: "Iraq Breaks with Britain" in Nineteenth Century and After, June, 1948: also "Nationalism in Iraq," in World To-day, Jan. '49.

<sup>11.</sup> Kimche: "Russia and the Middle East," in Nineteenth Century and After, April, '49.

the Centre in 1944 and 1945 which formed a basis for later plans fostered by individual states of the West and still later by U.N.<sup>12</sup>

These then are the inescapable foundations on which the Western powers are attempting to rebuild their position in the Middle East: a legacy of distrust and disunity among the Arab states, and a backward, perhaps explosive, set of social conditions. The policies which have been followed in this situation may be reviewed on two levels: political rapprochement with the Arab governments, and large scale plans for economic development. These matters will now be considered in turn.

The complexities governing political relationships between the West and the Middle East have already been indicated. The posittion was further complicated after 1945 by a diplomatic offensive on the part of the Soviet Union throughout the Middle East as a whole, and by Soviet pressure on Iran and Turkey.13 It has been reported14 that in 1943, a "fact-finding tour" covering Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Palestine was undertaken by the Soviet's Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, M. Maisky. M. Maisky's report has been represented as the basis of subsequent Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East. In addition to activity in respect of Iran and Turkey, which has yet to be considered, this included early recognition of the republics Syria and Lebanon and the establishment there of diplomatic missions; support for Egyptian demands for revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, and the opening of a legation in Egypt; a series of missions to Palestine, and instructions to Communist organisations there to support the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Arab Higher Committee; an active policy or policies in U.N.O. over the Palestine conflict. On the issue of the Italian colonies, the Soviet at one stage sought trusteeship over Tripolitania, Western province of Libya, commanding an approach from the west to Egypt. 15 Other more general aspects of the offensive apparently included the cultivation of minority groups, dissemination of propaganda, promotion of 'front' organisations, infiltration into trade unions by Communists, instructions to all Communist organisations to promote the concept of national liberation "as the revolutionary principle best suited to the Middle East."16

<sup>12. &</sup>quot;Food Production in Iraq and Persia"-World To-day, Nov. '47.

 <sup>&</sup>quot;The Race Between Russia and Reform in Iran," by T. Cuyler Young, in Foreign Affairs.
Jan. '50; "Persia and the U.S.S.R." in World To-day, March, '48; "Turkey Faces the Soviet," by Neemeddin Sadak, in Foreign Affairs, April, '49.

 <sup>&</sup>quot;The Sources of Soviet Policy in the Middle East," by Ladislas Farago in United Nations World, August, '48.

 <sup>&</sup>quot;The Problem of the Former Italian Colonies," by Wainhouse and Mangano, in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXI., No. 532, Sept. 12, 1949. P. 364.

<sup>16.</sup> Ladislas Farago, loc. cit, pp. 20-21.

This attempt to extend Soviet influence was on the whole unsuccessful, although its nuisance value to the West may have been considerable. The two most signal cases of failure, however, were in respect of Turkey and Iran where direct pressure was applied. With regard to Turkey: in 1945 the Soviet denounced her nonaggression pact with this country, and offered a new treaty on condition that (1) she be granted bases on the Dardanelles, and (2) that Turkey's eastern borders be rectified in the Soviet's favour. These demands were pressed during 1946, but were rejected by the Turkish government. Secondly, concerning Iran: this country took the problem of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from her territory to the United Nations in 1946, and in the same year quelled the revolt in Azerbaijan which was Communist-supported. In 1947, the Iranian mailas refused to ratify a pending agreement which would have given the Soviet access to oil resources in Northern Iran. Both Turkey and Iran have since openly sought economic and military aid from the West.

The possible extension of Soviet influence through unofficial channels still remains as a longer range possibility, but the Soviet's relative failure on the diplomatic level has simplified the task of the West to re-establish satisfactory political relationships throughout the Middle East. British policy since 1945 has been influenced by an enforced retreat from two key positions, Egypt and Palestine. In Egypt,17 although the last word probably has not been written, Britain failed, in negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty during 1946 and 1947, to secure agreement to proposals she considered essential for the defence of the Canal zone and for wider purposes in the Middle East. The negotiations lapsed, with the result that the 1936 Treaty remains in force, but under protest from Egypt. It should be noted in passing, that Egypt was regarded, at least until the Palestine war, as perhaps the strongest number of the Arab league. In Palestine, Britain surrendered the Mandate in a situation which was proving untenable and embittering Arabs and Jews alike. In May, 1948, she quit the country with great loss of prestige. Just before doing so, Britain offered Iraq a treaty, in January, 1948,18 which might well have served the dual purpose of securing an alternative military alliance of some strength, and of providing the Arab league with strong leadership. The Portsmouth Treaty, as it was known, made provision for defence facilities for the British in Iraq, and went so far as to offer arms for the Iraqi army on the same priority as for the British

Seton-Williams, p. 76 ff: see also Kimche, "Incurable Egyptomania," in New Statesman and Nation, 26/3/49.

<sup>18.</sup> Kimche, in Nineteenth Century, June, '48; World To-day, Jan. '49.

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army. The Saleh Jabr government signed the Treaty on February 15th, 1948: it touched off a minor revolution which led to the installation of a new, anti-British Government under Mohammed-al-Sadr. One of the ministers of the new government, Mahdi Kubba, had been associated with the Rashid Ali revolt of 1941.

The attempt to court Iraq thus ended in disaster. One commentator wrote of the situation:

"Not even in Palestine have I seen such universal and uninhibited anti-British sentiment."19

The persistence of this attitude may be judged from the fact that to this day, Iraq refuses to pump oil from the British concessions in Kirkuk to the refineries in Haifa, to the detriment of her own finances, and at the cost to the British economy of \$50,000,000 per year.20 Yet, paradoxically enough, Iraq continues to send her young officers to Britain for training under the terms of the 1936 treaty which remains in force, and to seek advisers from Britain in various capacities. A recent change of Government involving the return to the Ministry of Salah Jabr could lead to an improvement of relations between Britain and Iraq.21

A second line pursued by Britain has been the development of her alliance with Transjordan. Relationships between Britain and Transjordan over a long period have been steady and friendly. In 1946 and 1948 Britain signed treaties with Transjordan in which she recognised that State as sovereign and independent. Provision was made for the retention of British troops in Transjordan, for the maintenance of R.A.A.F. units in Amman and Mafrak, for the establishment of a Joint Defence Board between the two countries, and for financial assistance from Britain to Transjordan to enable the latter to carry out her obligations under the treaty.<sup>22</sup>

The military force of Transjordan is the Arab Legion. It has been trained over the years by the British, and even contained some British personnel when it entered the Palestine war. Moreover, when Britain withdrew from Palestine the Legion was well-placed to carry out its offensive. As has been indicated, Transjordan's status and territory have been enhanced as a result of her role in this conflict, and by her subsequent annexation of Arab Palestine which has been recognised in a cautious way, by the British Foreign Office.23 It is also true that elements exist in both Iraq and Syria favourable to the further development of Abdullah's Greater Syria

<sup>19.</sup> Kimche: Loc. cit.

<sup>20.</sup> Aust. Jewish Herald, 6/4/50, p. 1, quoting House of Commons Foreign Policy debate.

B.B.C. News, 2 a.m., 6/2/50.
 Seton-Williams, pp. 174-6; also text of 1948 Treaty at Appendix 12, p. 278 ff; also Current Notes, Vol. 20. No. 5. May. '49. "The Kingdom of Transjordan." pp. 574-83.

23. Aust. Jewish Herald, 28/4/50, 5/5/50; B.B.C. News, 9a.m., 28/4/50.

plan and that the political situation in both countries is unstable. On the other hand there is also considerable opposition. It remains to be seen whether the plan can be pursued or not.<sup>24</sup> Irrespective of this issue, however, Britain's alliance with Transjordan must be regarded as of some weight in the political scales of the Middle East.

A third line—though in this the participation of the Western powers has been indirect—has consisted of one or two moves towards the formation of an Eastern bloc under the military leadership of Turkey. Turkey has been regarded by many observers as the cornerstone of Allied policy in the Middle East and this view is reflected in U.S. military aid to Turkey at the present time. A precedent exists for such a bloc in the Saadabad mutual assistance pact signed in 1937 by Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.<sup>25</sup> In 1946 and 1947, two events suggested the possible revival of such arrangements, namely pacts signed between Turkey and Iraq, between Turkey and Transjordan.<sup>26</sup> Overtures from Turkey to Syria, however, were rejected. Just recently, Turkey has signed a Treaty of Friendship with Italy on the other side of the Mediterranean. This also could have important implications for the Middle East powers.<sup>27</sup>

Fourthly, Britain made a clear attempt to make secure the approaches to Egypt by proposing Trusteeship for herself over the province Cyrenaica in Libya. The final decision of U.N. to make Libya as a whole an independent sovereign state by January 1st, 1952, involved the rejection of this proposal.<sup>28</sup>

(To be continued in next issue)

<sup>24. &</sup>quot;Cross Currents Within the Arab League," in World To-day, January, '48.

<sup>25.</sup> Seton-Williams, pp. 41-2; Text at Appendix 20, p. 304.

<sup>26.</sup> Kimche: "Russia and the Middle East," Nineteenth Century and After, April, '49.

<sup>27.</sup> Signed 25/3/50.

Wainhouse and Mangano, loc. cit., also Current Notes, Vol. 20, No. 12. Dec. '49, p. 1261 ff. for text of U.N. Resolution, 21/11/49.

# Self-Government For Malaya?

Henry Mayer.

# External Aspects.

The aim of "self government for Malaya", even when qualified by "within the Commonwealth" is the avowed policy of the British government. The question of how rapidly such self government will be promoted is, I would argue, bound to be affected by Britain's general economic position, which in turn cannot be viewed without some reference to international politics.

In 1948, when sterling area exports to the U.S.A. amounted to \$1,356,000,000, Malaya's contribution was \$270 million, or about 20% of the total. Rubber exports played a major part, accounting for about \$200 million, while tin made up the major part of the balance. In Malaya's export trade, the United States of America took the first place, followed by the United Kingdom, Indonesia, the Soviet Union, Australia, France, and Hongkong in that order. Imports from the United States of America took sixth place after the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, and Australia.

Now the fact that rubber is a dollar earner must affect the policy of the British government—of any British government regardless of its political complexion, though the *degree* to which the policy is affected may be influenced by that complexion.

A major aim of the present British administration has been to foster the growth of a healthy trade union movement in Malaya. This growth was conceived as being a factor in the training of the peoples of Malaya in self government. But the question at once arises as to what would be the effect of a "healthy" trade union movement on Malaya's economy, and on Britain's dollar earnings.

Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China, Malaya's major rice suppliers, had been torn apart by war, enemy occupation, and civil strife. Shipping was disorganized. Hence the external sources of rice for Malaya could not be easily restored after the war. But for the last fifty years or so Malaya has not been able to supply more than 30-40 per cent. of its rice needs from its own resources. Of the six million acres cultivated in Malaya—which is only about one-

<sup>1. &</sup>quot;Malaya: Economic Conditions" Foreign Commerce Weekly (Washington) 31-10-49.

sixth of its total area, the rest being forests and swamps—rice occupies just over an eighth. It forms a broad belt in the north-west (Perlis, Kedah and Province Wellesley) and the north-east (Trengganu and Kelantan), providing seasonal employment for about 330,000 people. The general rice pattern is that of a subsistence economy, though there has been a trend here, as in general in Southeast Asia, for elements of a commercial economy to emerge. This is partly due to the fact that rents and taxes must be paid in cash and partly that the increasing economic development of Malaya by the British and Chinese has given the Malays a chance to use the seasonal nature of rice growing in running small holdings of cash crops, or, to a lesser extent, in seeking work for wages.

The British administration did not have a free hand in importing rice after the war.<sup>2</sup> Through a programme of flour imports and large-scale communal feeding schemes, it attempted to meet the rice shortage, but in spite of all efforts the ration in May 1949 was still well below the pre-war average of 18 ounces daily, though it had risen from the basic ration of 1.4-5 ounces which operated in the various territories in 1946.<sup>3</sup> Hence the black market in rice played an important part, and real wages in 1948 had fallen by about 25 per cent. as compared with prewar.<sup>4</sup>

Against this background, it is clear that any "healthy" trade union movement would press for wage increases, and if one remembers the extreme difficulties the British government has experienced in its appeals to the Trade Unions to restrict what are conceived as sectional claims for the sake of what are presented to be national interests, one can hardly expect very much restraint from any genuine Trade Union movement in Malaya. But, if this argument be granted, and if it be remembered that labour costs play a very important part in the price of rubber, that Malaya's natural rubber is already competing with synthetic rubber, and that Indonesian production is likely to increase, then it would seem that any "healthy" trade union movement would in fact, at least in the short run, be likely to decrease Malaya's dollar earnings. This would be the case even after due allowance is made for the fact that roughly 40 per cent. of Malaya's rubber comes from smallholdings.

The International Emergency Food Council, operating first through a South-East Asia Rice Pool, and later through its Rice Sub-Committee, was responsible for allocations to importing countries.

 <sup>&</sup>quot;British Dependencies in the Far East" Cmd. 7709, p. 33. The rice shortage is not due to
any further falling off of Malaya's internal production which in 1948-9 exceeded the prewas average of 1934-8. ("Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East" 1948, p. 50).

S. S. Awberry and F. W. Dalley: "Labour and Trade Union Organization in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore" (Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1948) p. 5.

In other words, there is a very definite conflict between economic recovery and social reform—social reform which is conceived as a prerequisite of political reform. If it be granted that both objectives cannot, at the same time, be pursued with equal vigour, then it may be argued that the type of policy one advocates will very largely depend on one's general social values, and, in the writer's opinion, cannot be determined in any "scientific" way. No good purpose seems to be served by vague talk about "wise statesmanship", it may be more fruitful to recognize the existence of conflicting objectives. In order not to be misunderstood, the writer personally would favour a vigorous and independent Trade Union movement in Malaya, under non-Stalinist but militant leadership even at the expense of diminishing the flow of dollars, and all that this implies.

There is of course the possibility that the United States would in some way be prepared to assist Malaya, and thus Britain, by bolstering the export of natural rubber. Mr. P. W. Litchfield, the chairman of Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Company, recently wrote that the United States of America must maintain Government owned facilities for the production of synthetic rubber "up to the point of protecting our own national security and at the same time giving fair consideration to the economic health of the friendly nations which depend upon rubber exports as a substantial source of American dollars."

As for tin, world production now exceeds consumption, and the United States tinplate industry, using the electrolytic process, "only uses about two-thirds of the amount of tin which would have been used before the war for the same tonnage of tin plate".6

Now the connection between rubber and tin exports by Malaya to the United States and between social reform and self government inside Malaya is a peculiar one. Tin and rubber are used for stockpiling by the United States; and the extent of stockpiling is in turn influenced by the degree of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. But, while the defence aspect of the matter thus dictates a policy of self-reliance, a policy which would encourage the development of synthetic rubber and the search for processes diminishing United States dependence on overseas tin, or for tin mines in Latin America, at the same time the political aspect means that Malayan exports, and thus the earning of dollars by Great Britain, ought to be encouraged by the United States.

If the United States were to pursue a policy which would drastic-

<sup>5.</sup> From a company report, British Malaya, Vol. 24, No. 9, January 1950, p. xvii. My italics.
6. "Tin Review" British Malaya February 1950, p. 401.

ally reduce Malaya's exports, she would at the same time weaken Great Britain's position in Europe. On the other hand, there are bound to be strong pressures from sections of the United States industry for such a policy. The question goes even farther, for it is tied up with the extent of communist unrest in South-east Asia. Put in the crudest form, the issue is whether the United States is prepared to bolster up the economy of Malaya—and this will be influenced by the amount of unrest in South-east Asia including Malaya.

It will be said at once that the above argument is absurd—for does it not amount to saying that Malaya's economy depends to some degree on continued unrest? And in that case, would not a policy of encouraging unrest be indicated? I do not think this conclusion need be drawn. Because, for example, it would be true to assert that defence preparations have an important influence on the stability of the American economy, it does not follow that one ought not to aim at the relief of international tension. If one would grant that assumption, then the communist case, that capitalism achieves stability only through preparation for war, would be valid.

All I am arguing here is that for Malaya the apocryphal story told about the Prime Minister of Monaco who applied for Marshall Aid and was told he could not receive it unless he first imported a few communists, has some application. If this be so, then again there are certain conflicts with regard to social reform and self government which flow from Malaya's position: On the one hand, the development of social reform and self government has been arrested by the communist uprising, not only because it is a heavy drain on the financial resources of the Federation, but also because it has encouraged, as does all resort to violence, the re-emergence of the bashi-bazouk elements amongst the die-hard defenders of the status quo. On the other hand, it does not seem to me to follow that once the uprising has been suppressed this will automatically mean a strengthening of Malaya's economy, and put an end to the conflict between reform and recovery outlined above.

# Internal Aspects.

Mr. Chifley once said that the general problem of Malaya, and especially the issues posed by its racial structure was "a very difficult problem which, ultimately, might prove insoluble."

Certainly, the issues are extremely complex. Neglecting the Indians, who may be excluded in an elementary analysis of this type, the basic division in Malaya is between the British who hold

<sup>7.</sup> Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, September 2nd, 1948, p. 65.

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the key positions of both economic and political power; the Chinese who hold considerable economic but little political power; and the Malays who have some political power, though not very much, and

very little economic power.

Malaya's racial problem is the concomitant of her rapid economic development. Her population grew from about 2.7 million in 1911 to nearly 5.9 million in 1947—an increase of about 118 per cent.8 The Malays, who on the whole were not very interested in working for the British, looked askance at the (possibly mixed) blessings of western capitalism. They still form a minority of the labour force, which is preponderantly Indian in the Federation and Chinese in Singapore.9 Rapid development of rubber and tin required rapid immigration of cheap labour, and it is this Chinese and Indian immigration which, with the natural excess of births over deaths, accounts for the increase in population. As one writer put it "the basic cause of this whole situation is the European effort to make quick money out of the resources of Malaya."10 One ought to qualify this by adding that the immediate causes of racial tension, as it developed in the post-war period, was the Japanese occupation: The resistance movement was almost wholly under the control of the Malayan Communist Party which has always been predominantly Chinese; and the Japanese used the Malay police against it. One should also add that the question of who is responsible for the problem does not give us much help at present.

The Malays base their claim for special consideration on the fact that they are indigenous, that Britain has a moral obligation to protect them, since she concluded her first treaties in the 1870's with the Malay sultans. They fear that they will be pushed to the wall by the economically active Chinese. They argue that the Chinese threaten to outbreed them.11 They contend that the Chinese are transients with no permanent loyalty to or longe-range interests

in Malava.

9. The racial composition of the labor force in 1946-7 was as follows: Federation: Indians 46 per cent., Chinese 32 per cent., Malays 17 per cent., others 5 per cent.; Singapore: Chinese 62 per cent., Indians 21 per cent., Malays, Javanese and others 17 per cent. ("Economic

<sup>8.</sup> The total population of the territory now comprised in the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore increased from 4,347,704 at the 1931 census to 5,848,910 at the 1947 census. From this figure transients, service personnel and Japanese surrendered personnel are excluded. Of the total population, the Federation accounted for 4,908,086 and Singapore for 940,824. The increase from 1931-1947 was 34.5%. ("Malaya: A Report of the 1947 Census of Population" by M. V. del Tufo-Crown Agents for the Colonies, London, 1949).

Survey," op. cit., p. 111).

10. W. S. Thompson: "Population and Peace in the Pacific," Univ. of Chicago Press, 1946. p. 292.

11. For figures on the Chinese component in Malaya, see V. Purcell: "The Chinese in Malaya", Appendix 3. The 1947 census showed that since 1931 the Malaysian component had increased by 35.8 per cent., and the Chinese by 54.4 per cent. For the whole question of "indigenous" Malays cf. C. A. Vlieland: "The 1947 Census of Malaya" Pacific Affairs, March 1949. It would seem impossible to predict much about the future increase of the Chinese in Malaya since we do not know what type of immigration policy will operate.

The Chinese reply that at least a sizable minority of Malays are not indigenous, being immigrants from Indonesia. Why should not the Chinese develop the country if the Malays were unwilling to do so? More and more Chinese, they claim, are becoming permanent

settlers, and surely they ought to have political rights.

The British administration is uneasily perched between these conflicting claims. It cannot but recognize its obligations to the Malays. it cannot ignore the claims of the Chinese. Each concession made to one group calls forth the hostility of the other; or else the whole British policy is interpreted as one of "divide and rule". Withdrawal wuld solve nothing-it would mean that the Chinese, who outwit, outwait, outwork and possibly outbreed the Malays would become the new overlords. Fusion seems to be excluded between groups with different religions, customs, economic functions and political aspirations. Partition has recently been mentioned, but was dismissed as a council of despair, 12 as indeed it is: it would not be much less fantastic than the division of Great Britain into a Labour and Conservative portion, with the Liberals forming an enclave and the Stalinists (whom one would have to separate most carefully from the Trotskyists, I.L.P.'ers and so on, if bloodshed were to be avoided) settled on the cliffs of Dover.

I think we must start with the assumption that both Malays and Chinese are there to stay. Either one group will predominate, or some way must be sought by which the racial division will be overshadowed by a common and permanent loyalty to Malaya. This is in fact the policy of the present British Government as outlined

by Mr. Attlee in March this year. He declared:

"The purpose of our policy is simple: we are working in cooperation with the citizens of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore to guide them to responsible self government within the Commonwealth. We have no intention of jeopardizing the security, well-being, or liberty of these peoples, for whom Britain has responsibility, by premature withdrawal". In the House of Lords, Lord Swinton emphasized that ability to govern and a body truly representative of all sections of Malaya were two essential prerequisites for such a policy. Whether one conceives of this change of policy as an advance, is a matter of one's general values, but that it is a startling change can hardly be questioned.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12.</sup> I Morrison, "Aspects of the Racial Problem in Malaya," Pacific Affairs, September, 1949.

13. cf. the views of the Governor (Sir Hugh Clifford) in 1927, when he said with reference to the Federated Malay States: "No mandate has ever been extended to us by the Rajas, Chiefs, or people to vary the system of government which has existed in these territories from times immemorial; and in these days when democratic and socialist theories are spreading like infection, bringing with them too often not peace but the sword, I feel it incumbent upon me to emphasize thus early in my allotted term of office, the utter inapplicability of any form of democratic or popular government to the circumstances of these states." (q. by N. Raghavan: "Freedom Movement in Malaya," Indian Council of World Affairs, 1947, p. 7.)

At present, there is very little self government in Malaya. The Federation consists of the pre-war Federated and Unfederated States, and the settlements of Penang and Malacca. The de facto power is exercised by the British High Commissioner, responsible solely to Britain. There is a Legislative Council with 16 official and 66 unofficial members, all nominated by the High Commissioner. The unofficial members are to represent various interests—planting, commerce, mining, labour, etc. - and the Malay section has an absolute majority of one over the rest. The High Commissioner has very broad reserve powers, and must assent to bills passed. He consults with an Executive Council, entirely appointed, but provided he reports to the Secretary of State, may disregard its advice. Finally, there is a Conference of Rulers (i.e. of the sultans) which has little say, except on one vital issue—that of immigration. On this, should the High Commissioner and the rulers differ on any major change of policy, the final say rests with the Legislative Council, and only unofficial members must vote on the issue. This means, given the absolute Malay majority of one amongst the unofficial members, that Malays have the major say on any change of immigration policy.

In the states, the rulers are under de facto control of British Resident Advisers (except on issues of Malay customs or Muslim religion). However, they have had to grant a written constitution, and to set up State Executive Councils and Councils of State. At

the moment these bodies have little power.

While thus there hase been no basic change from pre-war days, still, minor changes have been made. There are more unofficial and Asiatic members, there are representatives of labour, and there are women, on the Legislative bodies.

More important, the 1947 White Paper promised elections for the Legislative Council "as soon as circumstances and local conditions permit" and the rulers have made a similar promise for the Councils of State.

It has been suggested that one of the main approaches to self government might be through the trade union movement, and some of the difficulties (quite apart from those based on race, inexperience, etc.) have been mentioned above. But the alternative of gradually increasing the elective element in local and later national bodies also presents great difficulties. The experience of Singapore is important. Singapore is a Crown Colony with a Gover-

<sup>14.</sup> The general intention, and also the proposals of the Communities Liaison Committee, would favour a start at the local rather than at the national level. In February this year the Legislative Council appointed a committee "to advise the Government on the policy to be incorporated in legislation to provide for elections to local government authorities."

nor who has the usual reserve powers. It has a Legislative Council with an unofficial majority, part of which is elected on a fairly broad franchise. There is also an elective element in its Municipal Commission. Yet, while about 200,000 people (out of a population of 940,000) were entitled to register for the rolls, only 22,000 did so, and of these only 63 per cent. voted at the first election in March, 1948. Whether this can be interpreted as political apathy on the part of the Chinese—which would run counter to the current theory that the Chinese are politically ambitious—I am unable to say, having been unable to get figures as to the racial composition of the electorate.<sup>15</sup> But it does, in any case, suggest that in Singapore at least, there was in 1948 no great upsurge of civic pride.

It is hard to see how the peoples of Malaya are to be trained for self government in any short period. All the usual proposals—participation in the Civil Service, training in schools, formation of liaison committees — suffer from the fact that they are essentially long range measures hardly adequate in an era of rapid and explosive change. Nor is there any broad nationalist movement based on popular support such as existed in India. Malay nationalism certainly exists but it appears, at the moment, as essentially a conservative minority movement.<sup>16</sup>

In fact, any immediate reforms in the direction of popular elections would at once strike the rock of who is to have the franchise. The main reason why the Malay Conservative organization (United Malays Nationalist Organization—(U.M.N.O.) led by Dato Onn Bin Ja'affar, former Chief Minister of Johore) opposed the proposition for a Malayan Union was precisely because it claimed that the acquisition of citizenship was made too easy for the Chinese and Indians and the consequent Federation made this much more difficult. Citizenship is not nationality, it does not affect the status of British subjects or of subjects of the sultans, but is an addition to nationality. Apart from the lowest ranks of the public service, no one is entitled to government employment unless he is a citizen. Non-citizens are excluded from scholarships for higher education and from appointments to the various legislative bodies. By the end of last year, about 3 million of the nearly 5 million inhabitants of the Federation had become citizens.

If the elective element is increased, the Malays may well fear

<sup>15.</sup> Singapore's racial composition (1947) was: Chinese 77.6 per cent., Malaysians 12.3 per cent., Indians 7.3 per cent., Europeans 1 per cent., Eurasians 1 per cent. Up to now Singapore parties have been on a non-communal basis and have largely concentrated on social welfare.

However, it has been claimed that U.N.M.O. is now broadening its appeal, but even if so
its aims pay little attention to social reform. cf. "Recent Developments in Malaya", Current
Notes, February 1950, p. 82.

such a reform, for, if at the same time citizenship is widened, it might lead to a legislature dominated by the Chinese. If the citizenship provisions stay as at present, the Chinese will be antagonized. At present, as pointed out, the Malays have considerable control over immigration policy and one would expect them to press for increased immigration from the U.S.I. which would be one way of counteracting Chinese influence.<sup>17</sup>

Now the basic objective of British policy is self government for Malaya within the Commonwealth. It is quite possible that the Malays will follow such a conception, but what guarantee exists, unless Britain by social reform on a large scale can show that she is no longer a colonial power in the old sense, that the Malays will not pursue a policy of self government within the U.S.I.? But, again, as argued at the beginning, large scale social reform is difficult to conceive at present.

The same type of dilemma seems to apply to the Chinese—if they, under representative government gain the upper hand, what guarantee is there that they will not turn their eyes towards China instead of the Commonwealth?

In other words, I am arguing that there is a basic contradiction in British policy. The gradual development of self government is conceived as primary. Given the objective that Malaya should stay in the Commonwealth there are three assumptions in this policy. It assumes that self government will lead to a distinctive loyalty of both main races to Malaya, yet a loyalty that will also comprise gratitude to Britain. A genuine nationalism is to be fostered, yet its object is to be determined by an outside body. It secondly seems to assume that the common loyalty thus created will at least abate racial tension, neglecting here the issue of the economic preponderance of the Chinese. It thirdly assumes that a self governing Malaya will not turn to the U.S.I., nor to China.

There is no need to conclude from the above that self government ought not to be developed in Malaya—but, if the arguments are at all valid, it would seem that there is a conflict between the development of self government through social reform and Britain's economic position; and between the object of self government and the desire to have Malaya stay in the Commonwealth.

One of the main planks of the Malay Nationalist Party—one of the groups which opposed Federation—was closer ties with Indonesia.

# The Significance of Modern Cults in Melanesian Development.

Cyril S. Belshaw.

Although we know that in New Caledonia and Fiji the Melanesian people have shown themselves capable of considerable political development,1 many of us who know the Melanesian2 in the New Hebrides, British Solomon Islands, and New Guinea are inclined to doubt the possibility, at least in the near future, of Melanesians organising their own political movements. The "Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels" of the war, emerging from the bush with hardly-come-by garden produce, resisting many forms of agricultural innovation, chewing betel nut, wearing cast-off clothing, speaking seemingly mutilated forms of English, appear to be far removed from any form of modern organisation. The British Solomon Island experiments in Native Courts and Councils, though a tremendously promising innovation, have been temporarily arrested by a strange native cult. The suggestion that there might before long be a pan-Melanesian nationalist movement would evoke incredulous smiles from most European island-residents, who point to the impossibility of persuading labourers from different communities to work together in harmony, to the multifarious languages and cultures, and to the absence of anything approaching a centralised organisation in traditional life.

It is the purpose of this article to suggest, however, that this is far too simple an interpretation of Melanesian possibilities. An analysis of certain apparently isolated Melanesian cults, which have grown up in European times, will give an indication of some of these possibilities. We may begin by a brief summary of their features.

# The Tuka Cult of Fiji.3

About 1885 a prophet arose among the hill tribes of Fiji. He

2. For the purpose of this article I do not attempt to distinguish between Papuans and Melanesians.

3. See A. B. Brewster, The Hill Tribes of Fiji, Seeley Service, 1922.

In both colonies there are indigenous tribal systems not found elsewhere in Melanesia. In New Caledonia the Melanesians have a limited franchise, in Fiji they play a prominent part in local politics.

claimed that it had been revealed to him that before long the whole world would be turned upside down, particularly that the whites would serve the natives, the chiefs would serve the common people, and his followers would have eternal life. Jehovah was subordinated to local gods, and through the use of supernatural powers derived from the gods, the prophet was enabled to secure the obedience of a large following. This following drilled in European style to repulse the expected advance of the Administration. The prophet was banished, but the belief in the *tuka* cult continued.

# The Baigona Cult of Papua.4

The Baigona Snake Cult of the Northern Division of Papua operated for many years from 1911. The prophet had the secrets of sorcery and prophesy revealed to him by the Baigona Snake, and cultivated its good-will by special rites. He sold the secrets of the cult to those who wished to be initiated. The movement was characterised by trances. Its rise coincided with the attempt to bring the area under administrative control. An administrative patrol was endangered and administrative pressure to reduce the trances and abolish the sale of initiation in accordance with antisorcery policy was not completely successful.

#### The Lontis Cult of Buka.

I have not been able to find details of this cult, which occurred in 1913 during the German administration. Numerous arrests were made.

# The German Wislin of the Torres Straits.5

This is the first clear specimen of the genus now known as "Cargo Cult". It occurred in 1913 on the island of Saibai, Torres Straits. The prophet declared that his followers would see the *markai*, the spirits of the dead, who would come to them in a steamer, bringing all kinds of manufactured cargo, and who would kill all the whites. Those who disobeyed the prophet would lose all their money and would be unable to earn any more.

# The Taro Cult and its Relatives in Papua.6

This cult, very much akin to the Baigona, but in which the native vegetable taro took the place of the baigona snake, was more

See Papua Annual Reports 1911/12 p. 129, 1912/13 p. 154, 1919/20 p. 63; Chinnery and Haddon, Five New Religious Cults in British New Guinea, Hibbert Journal, XV, 3, 1917; Williams, F. E., Orokaiva Magic, Oxford 1928.

<sup>5.</sup> See Chinnery and Haddon, op. cit.

<sup>6.</sup> See Chinnery and Haddon, op. cit.; Williams. op. cit.

vigorous in its proselytism and lasted from 1914 into the late twenties. Dreams, ritual, and shaking fits played a prominent part in it. Off-shoots were the Kava Kava and Kekesi cults in the same area (Northern Division).

# The Vailala Madness of Papua.7

The "Vailala Madness", which swept the Gulf Division of Papua from 1919 to 1923, was in the hands of sorcerers who had the power of divination during trances, and who encouraged their followers to take part in orgies of shaking fits. The great bull-roarer ceremonies of the kinship groups were abandoned, and new ceremonies were created to take their place. A steamer was expected, bringing the deceased relatives who were to have white skins. The new ceremonies contained a Christian element, flag-poles were given names and treated as the media through whom messages from the dead were received, there was a certain element of military drill, and women were given equality. Public confessionals took place.

# The Murder of Clapcott, New Hebrides.8

In 1923 the inland people of Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, were influenced by rumours of death-raising. The prophet concerned claimed that if all the Europeans were killed the dead would arise, with white skins. They would bring European goods with them, and a house was built to receive these. To join the movement, it was necessary to pay a pig, or a fee of 5/- to one pound. During a great feast the prophet's wife died, and a European, Clapcott, was immediately killed. It is stated that the same people killed some Europeans called Greig in 1908, but details do not seem to have been published. These are the only occasions in which Europeans have been assaulted during these movements, though resistance and threats have been offered on several occasions.

# The Cargo Cults of Buka.10

In 1932 and 1933 a cargo cult arose which appeared to be related to the previously mentioned *Lontis* cult. The prophets claimed that a steamer would arrive, laden with good things, and that all Buka would be ruled from their village. A store was to be

See F. E. Williams, The Vailala Madness, Papuan Anthropology Report No. 4, Port Moresby, 1923, the best account which has yet appeared of any of these movements.

<sup>8.</sup> See Appendix in Williams, 1928, op. cit.

I am assuming that the numerous killings in the nineteenth century, the two revolts in New Caledonia, and the murder of Europeans and police on Guadalcanal and Malaita in 1927, were not accompanied by these movements.

Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the Territory of New Guinea, Canberra, 1933/4, 1934/5.

biult to receive these goods, and the police to be resisted if they interfered. But the ship would not come while food was available, and hence gardens were abandoned for some time. The leaders were imprisoned, but the cult continued.

The Markham Cargo Cult, New Guinea.11

In 1933 a prophet arose in this area who claimed that Jehovah was subordinate to Satan. Once again the spirits of the dead were expected to return, bringing goods; gardens lapsed; and seances took place. Villages were destroyed and community houses built, and it was erroneously believed that the Administration would be passive.

### The Chair and Rule Movement of the Solomons. 12

About 1939 a European missionary encouraged the Melanesians of Santa Ysabel, Gela and Savo to agitate for a seat on the nominated Advisory Council. He emphasised the need for a chairman and rules of procedure. The movement got out of hand and was misinterpreted. The Melanesians elevated a flag, a wooden chair and a wooden rule into positions of ritual importance. They wrote to friends in San Cristoval and agitated for higher wages. Those involved were punished and the missionary asked to leave the Protectorate. His memory was still revered in 1945 among some people. The Administration was prompted into plans for Native Courts and Councils by this movement.

# The John Frum Movement, New Hebrides.13

In 1940 a native of the island of Tanna declared himself to be the prophet of John Frum, a spirit which evidently took the place of the ancient spirit of Karaperamun, formerly of great power. John Frum declared that the whole island was shortly to change in nature—its volcanic cone to be replaced by fertile plains, its people to be eternally young and healthy, and to have everything that they could ever desire. In order to achieve this end, it was necessary to hunt and kill all Europeans, to rid themselves of the taint of European money, to rid themselves of immigrant natives, and to return to the old customs of polygyny, dancing, kava-drinking and so forth which had been rigidly proscribed by the theocratic Presbyterian Church. Money was taken to the stores and a great spending spree indulged in. The Administration took action; arrests were made.

<sup>11.</sup> Ibid, 1934/5.

<sup>12.</sup> Based on Melanesian informants,

See P. O'Reilly, Prophétisme aux Nouvelles-Hébrides, le Mouvement Jonfrum à Tanna (1940-1947), Le Monde non-Chrétien, n.s., 10, 1949; I am also indebted to a letter from Rev. J. Miller in 1947.

The movement continued, however, especially in 1942, 1943, and 1947, encouraged by letters from the former leaders, who had been banished to Malekula. A modern touch was added by the construction of an aerodrome for American Liberators. The imprisoned leaders succeeded in converting neighbouring villages on Malekula. A similar movement arose on Ambryn, in which a house was built to receive goods from the Messageries Maritimes steamer, Le Polynésien.

### The Naked Cult, Espiritu Santo.14

This cult, seen from 1944 to 1948, appears to be connected with the Clapcott Murder Case mentioned previously. It has, however, rather different features. The followers of the prophet are to go naked and are to cohabit in public. Villages are to be destroyed and replaced by two communal houses, one for the men and one for the women. All animals and property received from the Europeans is to be destroyed. Old customs such as exogamy and marriage payments are to be scrapped. The people are no longer to work for the Europeans, but to wait for the arrival of the Americans, when they will receive all good things. The people are to have immortality.

# The Masinga Rule<sup>15</sup> Movement of the Solomons. <sup>16</sup>

The Masinga rule movement first made its appearance at the end of 1945 and in 1946 and is the most political of any of the movements that have yet appeared. In its early stages it appeared to have connections with the earlier Chair and Rule movement, and with disaffection which was rife on Guadalcanal, following the presence of Allied troops. It soon took on its own form, however, with Malaita the centre. Buildings were erected to warehouse the expected free gifts from American liberators; monetary contributions were exacted from the adherents of the movement; the leaders were reputed to have boundless wealth in dollars and to pay their followers twelve pounds a month; Melanesians were forbidden to work for Europeans unless a wage of twelve pounds a month was paid; missionary and admini-

See J. G. Miller, Naked Cult in Central West Santo, Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 57, No. 4, 1948.

<sup>15.</sup> This is the correct name of this movement, masinga being an Ariari word meaning brother. The version Marching Rule was due to European attempts to decipher the word, and to its pronunciation by Melanesians who did not speak Ariari. The version Marxian Rule is due to the hysteria of some Europeans who like to see communism in every Eastern nationalist movement.

<sup>16.</sup> See C. S. Belshaw, Native Politics in the Solomon Islands, Pacific Affairs, 1947, and Island Administration in the Western Pacific, Royal Institute of International Affairs and Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950. I am also indebted to conversations with administrative officials in London during 1949. See also Colonial Annual Report for the British Solomon Islands, 1948.

strative work was resisted; demonstrations of several thousand natives took place on Government stations demanding education, higher wages, political independence, and the removal of Europeans; "soldiers" were drilled; the central organisation on Malaita established connections with Ulawa and San Cristoval and the movement was eventually copied in the Santa Cruz group and the Western Solomons. At first the Administration was prepared to tolerate the movement and wait for it to die out, but as resistance, and particularly drilling, grew in scale, several score of arrests were made. The movement still continues, and so do the arrests.

# Other Contemporary Movements.17

At the close of the recent war, Melanesia was left with three described movements, Masinga Rule, John Frum, and the Naked Cult. There appears, however, to have been a general revival of similar movements all over Melanesia, with the possible exception of New Caledonia, though we still await published details of them. There is the Apolisi prophet movement of Fiji, a cargo cult in the Loyalty Islands (the first reported) and in New Guinea, and a similar movement in the Purari Delta of Papua. This latter appears to have interesting possibilities, for it is reported that for the first time the Administration, while watching it carefully, is encouraging it and aiding it in its development programme—including rebuilding of villages and re-organisaton of agriculture. (These two objectives were also part of the Masinga Rule movement, but neither Melanesian leadership nor Administration pursued them vigorously.)

These then are the principal details of about thirteen movements that have been described over the past fifty years. What is their significance?

The first point to notice is that the movements are widely separated in time and place, from the Torres Straits to Fiji, and that this effectively rules out the possibility that they are copies of each other. Their similarities must be due to similarities in local conditions which produce them.

The movements fall into two main groups, with borderline cases in between. The first of these is seen in its purest form in the Baigona and Taro Cults in Papua. There is no hint here of conflict with the European until the European Administrator, from the Melanesian

<sup>17.</sup> I have been unable to consult the manuscript of W. E. H. Stanner's forthcoming book, or his Reconstruction in the South Pacific Islands: A Preliminary Report. Part I. Papua-New Guinea, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947, in which an analysis of cargo cult and some modern movements is made.

point of view, "butts in". In their essentials, the cults are similar to those found everywhere in Melanesia at the time of the arrival of the Europeans. They express the indigenous Melanesian animist interpretation of the world and his centuries-old traditional delight in ceremonial and cult-practices. They are novel only in that their origins have been observed and not speculated about, and from this point of view they are of considerable interest to the sociologist.

The other cults are a modern modification of this phenomenon. But before we make this clear, a number of alternative hypotheses may be disposed of.

First, there is the understandable Administrative view that these are dangerous movements, interrupting Melanesian life, threatening good order, and evidencing the unhealthy despotic powers of sorcerers who, by trickery, have bullied the local people, and who make their fortune by the sale of their tricks. Of the political aspects of this view, I will speak later. But as a theory of origins it is most defective. No leader, it must be emphasised, in the absence of mechanical instruments or a police state, can force people to follow him or accept his doctrines. The traditional Melanesian method of avoiding unwanted leaders is simply to move somewhere else, found a new village, grow new gardens, or retaliate by countersorcery or murder. It must be accepted that the religious element in these cults is sufficiently near the Melanesian pattern to enable us to believe that their following is by and large popular. As for the sale of the tricks of the trade, that too is common to most forms of Melanesian sorcery, and even to the passing on of dance movements and songs. It is, as it were, payment for copyright.

Secondly, there is the view that the cults express a reaction to a particular event or organisation. It is superficially possible, for instance, to blame the John Frum movement on to the rather rigid and narrow interpretations of recent Presbyterian proselytising. <sup>19</sup> Similarly, one could blame the Espiritu Santo movement on to the sale of liquor and to other abuses by the traders. And the Masinga Rule movement has been blamed on "Marxist elements" among American troops.

All these views possess an element of truth, but all lack conviction. Why should such diverse historical facts give rise to such unified movements? On the other hand, if we describe the position

See for instance C. E. Fox, Threshold of the Pacific, Kegan Paul 1924; A. B. Deacon, Malekula, Routledge 1934; J. W. Layard, Stone Men of Malekula, Chatto & Windus; Cambridge Expedition to the Torres Straits 1908.

This is not a criticism of present missionary methods, which show much greater awareness
of possible reactions.

of these Melanesian communities in the modern world we can see that there is indeed a common element.

None of these communities is untouched by European influence; and none of them has been able to take full advantage of living under that influence. Moving roughly West to East, the Torres Straits have been the happy hunting grounds of pearl fishers and labour recruiters, but at the beginning of the century the island of Saibai was subject to no permanent European influences; the Gulf of Papua is not a favourite area of European exploitation, though there have been European planters there: Buka again is on the fringe of European activity: Gela it is true is very close to the pre-war Solomon Island capital of Tulagi-but here the movement was more definitely political rather than religious and it was stronger in the less developed north than in the more developed south; Malaita is a classic example, for here there was practically no European activity, while the almost over-populated communities sent their sons to other islands for plantation work; inland Espiritu Santo has hardly been visited by Europeans, though there is a thriving community on the coast; Tanna is a small island well off the beaten track, again exporting a few of its people as seamen; and the Loyalty Islands, unattractive to European settlers, live by exporting produce to Noumea, the New Caledonian capital. Inland Fiji, at the time of the Tuka cult, was quite primitive.

These people, then, have all been in contact with thriving European communities, but none of them have been able to participate in vigorous activity leading to a higher standard of life. I think it is most significant that the two extremes of Melanesian life do not appear so far to have succumbed to these cults, though they have problems of their own. On the one hand, we have the thriving native settlements in or near such towns as Port Moresby, Rabaul,<sup>20</sup> Vila and in New Caledonia, and areas of intensive missionary industrial work. Here the people are in the grip of modern life—and have little time or inclination to organise into cults. On the other hand, we have areas such as the interior of New Guinea and Malekula, where cults continue in their native form, unmodified by European intrusion.

If we accept this thesis, it is easy to understand that the similarities in the cults are due to the position of the communities half way between the old and the new way of living; and that the differences are due almost solely to particular historical circumstances. The universals seem to be these. The "half-way" Melanesian sees other people who possess a way of living that he tends

<sup>20.</sup> Though here there was a formidable general strike-I am assuming that it was not a cult.

to envy. He has to find some explanation of European power in holding sway over multitudes; of the miraculous arrival of manufactured goods in ships and aeroplanes; of strange European behaviour which sends away piles of raw materials; of the peculiar distaste with which Europeans treat him. On the one hand, this gives him an end of activity—he must strive to attain a similar power. On the other hand, it sets him an intellectual problem and gives him an emotional experience. His emotional experience is jealousy, sometimes hatred, of the European, who neither gives him these things as a friend nor inititates him into the mysteries of the process of sale and production—indeed, tries to fob him off with Biblical education.<sup>21</sup> His intellectual problem is, first, to explain European success, and, second, to achieve a method of parallel success.

This problem must be solved in terms of Melanesian experience. There is behind him the great tradition of cults such as the Baigona, and animism. It is natural that he should turn to find a superior cult. At first, it was Christianity in many parts, which was conceived as a superior, sometimes as a supplementary, animism. This fails, or is not understood, and is moulded on to something new. The new cult endeavours to copy significant European activities. There is the belief in shipping, that is in the origin of cargoes for remember most Melanesians have not seen or experienced the manufacturing process. There is a mystical significance in the revolting white skin of Europeans, and in money, which circulates so strangely; in flags and flag-poles, which the European treats with peculiar reverence; in towns and houses rather than villages; in soldiers and drilling—which must be mystical, for what use is there in it? And in later years, of course, there is the myth of American arrival, so obviously based upon the big-handedness and freedom of American troops. These things supplied the modern elements in the cargo myth, the myth which explained European successes and indicated the correct road to follow.

Administrations have a tremendous task before them. They must adapt the Melanesian to live a modern life, without destroying unique elements of value in his culture. What attitude should they adopt to the cargo cult?

With one possible exception, that of the current movement in the Purari Delta, Administrations have treated the cults with police measures. In no case have they destroyed the cult until it was ready to die of its own accord. Usually it re-appeared some

<sup>21.</sup> In the words of a Native Medical Practitioner.

years later in more virulent form. Police measures are often necessary, but always inadequate.<sup>22</sup>

The threat to law and order is nothing to the greater threat to future relations between Melanesian and European. The Melanesian wants to know the secret of our success. It is up to us to tell him. We need to teach him all we can of agricultural development, manufacturing processes, and market activity, so that he can understand correctly his possibilities and limitations. At the same time, we must build commercial development upon indigenous processes in the village, rather than upon alien plantation systems, for in this way the Melanesian may be brought to realise that he can work out his own future rationally, along his own lines, with native dignity, and that he does not have to invent new methods or make crude, distorted copies of ours. If we can do this, now and quickly, we can at one blow restore confidence and empty the gaols; and give the Melanesian something to look forward to.

If, however, we neglect the warning—that the Melanesian can organise effectively for his own ends, however irrational those ends may appear to be—then we will truly stir up a vicious Melanesian national movement which in time will transcend colonial boundaries, and which will be so bitter in emotional content and so full of religious feeling that they will rapidly get out of hand. Already sophisticated educated natives are joining the movements, promising even more effective leadership, and every few years the cults grow in number. We can compare them, not without reason, to the great fanatical religions which have in the past swept New Zealand and other parts of Polynesia.<sup>23</sup>

 I am indebted to Mr. H. E. Maude of the South Pacific Commission, for a number of references.

<sup>22.</sup> I can understand this attitude. I myself, while an Administrative officer, was isolated with my wife and a Catholic missionary during the first upsurgings of Masinga Rule on the island of Ulawa. Police measures were certainly necessary and taken as soon as police were available.

# Book Reviews.

THE ADAPTABLE COMMONWEALTH. F. H. Soward, 1950 (London, O.U.P., pp. 62). 2/-.

The first feature of this highly condensed and informative booklet that arrests attention is its title. Under pressure from Ireland, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, there is a growing tendency in some academic circles to discard the adjective British when dealing with Commonwealth affairs. Strictly speaking, of course, the only member of "The Commonwealth" not in allegiance with the Crown and, therefore, not within the British Commonwealth of Nations properly so called, is the Republic of India. In view of the significance of the adjective British for those who, when the basic principles of the Commonwealth were in dire peril in and about 1940, were foremost in their defence, the dropping of it, except when the looser association which includes India is the subject of reference, or the substitution for it of the adjective "adaptable", as in this case, attracts more notice than is usually given to a name. At best the adjective adaptable is ambiguous, at worst it is invidious. It is obviously used in this connexion to suggest the flexibility which is so distinguishing a characteristic of the country whose parliament has enacted the statutes that have given legal expression to the tendencies that have resulted in the peaceful and lawful establishment of the Republics of Ireland and India.

Brief though the booklet is, it would be difficult to mention any major current issue of concern to the British Commonwealth that is not skilfully brought into focus in its pages. It is clear that the discussions which took place at Bigwin Inn, in the Muskoka country 140 miles north of Toronto, in September 1949, between delegates from the eight Commonwealth countries and Ireland, were both cogent and comprehensive. This masterly summary makes it no less clear that the Conference was fortunate in having Professor F. H. Soward of the University of British Columbia, as its recorder. The swiftness with which he penetrates to the heart of an issue and the succinctness with which he states the essence of it give a weight to this splendid publication far exceeding that which its size would suggest.

In this Commonwealth Relations Conference, however, as in those held in Toronto, near Sydney and in London respectively, it is evident that the delegates shrank from the implications of Lionel Curtis's pitilessly logical analysis of the fundamental problem of the Commonwealth. "We know blindly, or rather we feel," said one, and he an Australian, "that there is something peculiar and we feel it is worth while." It would have been refreshing to have had, even in these few pages, an epitome of a reply to Curtis's argument as closely reasoned and sincere as his own, and, with it, a little more about "form of co-operation on functional lines" rather than "any fixed pattern of co-operation."

The pithiness of this report almost necessarily precludes any account of the reaction of the delegates when their confreres from Ireland "reproachfully" told them that Irish neutrality in 1939 was a result of "the insistence upon forms in the period following the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921," such forms being looked upon in Ireland as "badges of servitude." Was that the view, it might be asked, of Arthur Griffith, or of Michael Collins or of Kevin O'Higgins or of William Cosgrove? When referring to the exceptions made in favour of Irish men in the United Kingdom by the Ireland Act of 1949, Professor Soward asserts (p. 52) "the greater adaptability of the Commonwealth today." But who,

other than the majority of the British House of Commons under the leadership of the Attlee Ministry, were then so "adaptable"? Furthermore, having regard to immediate background and prevailing political temper, were they then more "adaptable" than the House of Commons of 1921 which approved the—at the time—breathtaking concessions made to Irish national sentiment by Lloyd George, Austen Chamberlain and Lord Birkenhead (F. E. Smith)?

-C. H. Currey.

EUROPE IN DECAY: A STUDY IN DISINTEGRATION 1936-1940. By L. B. Namier. 1950. (London. MacMillan, viii+330. 16s.).

The writing of diplomatic history is at the best of times a difficult and often thankless task. The reluctance alike of Foreign Offices and governments, of the actors themselves, to release the full texts of crucial, revealing documents leaves large and often maddening gaps. "Secret diplomacy" and "diplomacy to conference" make it impossible to know some things with certainty. To the official publications, often carefully edited by a Bonnet or the Kremlin, must be added the spate of memoirs of the principals and subordinates. These are often mere apologia designed for the court room or posterity. Ciano's Diary gives the lie to his plea to Churchill that "I was the only foreigner to see at close quarters this loathsome clique of bandits (the Nazis) preparing to plunge the world into a bloody war" (p. 111). It requires at once exacting scholarship, a firm grasp of essentials and a profound understanding alike of processes and men to deal with the mass of material. These qualities, evident in the highest degree in Professor Namier's earlier volume, Diplomatic Prelude 1938-9, come out just as clearly in this masterly collection of essays.

Professor Namier, faced with the increasing volume of new material relevant to his theme, has wisely decided to postpone the revision of Diplomatic Prelude until the most important collections of documents have been published. To cope with the flood of memoirs and papers he has resorted to the device of the 'revelation' bag—supplementary essays critically analysing new material as it appears. This volume of essays is the result: an incisive appraisal of the memoirs of Flandin and Reynaud, Bonnet and Baudouin, Ciano and Winston Churchill, as well as diplomatic documents published by the British and Russian

governments.

The general outlines of his earlier account have been scarcely changed at all: there is, however, a mass of confirmatory detail which has filled in minor gaps and illuminated some of the deductions drawn from incomplete sources. His conclusions with regard to British and French negotiations with Moscow in 1939 are unaltered. Supplementary evidence makes clearer the long range planning and astute policies pursued by Hitler and Mussolini: Henlein and the Sudeten Germans were on the payroll of the German government as early as 1935. The new material makes possible some alteration in emphasis, e.g. the re-assessment of Baudouin's role.

The opening essay "Memoirs born of Defeat" gives the theme of the book: "Europe in Decay". The collapse of France, Professor Namier argues, was primarily a spiritual collapse. Memories of past greatness and demographic changes made France anxious to resume her role as a major power after 1919 but weakened her capacity to do so, resulting in a halting, uncertain foreign policy. "The French nation peered into the future in thankful wonder and haunting dread". An elderly decimated people "had lost le sens national" declared Flandin; "after 1918, the French soul bore the impress of martyrdom, not of victory" remarked Reynaud. The real culprits were not in the High Command, said Weygand. "It

is out of the question to punish the generals and not the teachers who have refused to develop in the children the sentiment of patriotism and sacrifice" (p. 86). The absence of a unifying common purpose, the atrophying of these psychological factors, which Renan says are the essence of nationalism, paralysed French initiative and will, and produced collapse. The quality of her leaders reflects this inner decay: Flandin with his vacillation and withdrawal into isolation; Laval with his convenient memory and his reluctance to consult his colleagues; Bonnet with a genius for self-deception and "a well nigh physical incapacity to tell the truth to the end" (p. 65); Reynaud, well meaning but vacillating, and lacking in judgment of men; the defeatist Pétain, Weygand and Gamelin ("when he speaks it is like sand running through one's fingers" p. 82); Baudouin, the appeaser who changed. The incapacity and moral weakness of France was only matched by the decadence of her opponents and allies: Ciano the astute spinner of short term policies with his brazen use of documents procured by an efficient secret service; Beck with "the streak of the gangster and a passion for power display and booty" (p. 163) as well as Hitler and Mussolini and Ribbentrop with his idée fixe of impending war, his "long nonsensical letters", and his lack of a clear grasp of the intricacies of diplomacy ("he is poorly, very poorly prepared for the discussion").

The German and Italian and Russian documents bring out with painful clarity the failure of Chamberlain's policy. The papers of Herbert von Dirksen, German Ambassador in London from May 1938 to September 1939, are "a testimonial for their [the Chamberlain Government's] genuine desire to reach a peaceful settlement with Germany" (p. 216). These and the other documents make equally clear the intrigues which Chamberlain resorted to in an attempt to circumvent a hostile Foreign Office and a critical Foreign Secretary: his overtures to Mussolini through Lady Chamberlain, and his interview with Grandi ("Chamberlain and Eden were not a Prime Minister and a Foreign Secretary discussing a delicate international situation with a foreign ambassador; there were before me . . . two enemies facing each other, like two cocks in truly proper fighting posture" (p. 160); the backstairs negotiations with Wohlthat. It is only too clear that Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, and the fatuous policy of Henderson in Berlin, often completely disregarding instructions to the point of revealing confidential information and encouraging German aggression by implication, evoked contempt and served to deepen the international crisis.

Professor Namier's analysis is a brilliant and incisive one, despite the slender theme running through this collection of essays. "It seems almost incredible, and certainly incomprehensible, that with danger so patent and the chances of escape so many, the nations should have meandered into the abyss, drawn into it one by one, most of them lacking on the brink the strength to resist, and while more remote, the will to succour" (p. 151). Winston Churchill emerges as the one far sighted man, and Professor Namier reviews with complete approval the first volume of his Memoirs. One would like to see a critical appraisal of the Chamberlain papers from his pen with more understanding of the very real difficulties of his government. It is perhaps the treatment of diplomatic moves out of their social and economic content that is the main but understandable weakness of these diplomatic essays. This could be corrected in a full scale account of the events of the inter-war period. Professor Namier is the master of the pregnant phrase, the penetrating judgment and the incisive analysis. One looks forward with anticipation to later "revelation' bags."

-N. D. Harper.

EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN MODERN GERMANY. R. H. Samuel and R. H. Thomas. Routledge and Kegan Paul (Int. Lib. of Soc. & Soc. Recon.). London 1949.

In the October, 1949, issue of International Affairs Mr. Robert Birley, late Educational Advisor to the British C-in-C in Germany and now Headmaster of Eton, criticises this book for not living up to the sociological element of its title. It was doubtless unfamiliarity with the development of German society which qualified Mr. Birley for his position in Germany and for the post he now holds. Only a very ingenuous reviewer would ask for a simultaneous treatise on German Education and German Society. What these authors have, in fact, done is to give an outline of the development of German education from the beginning of the 19th century set-up against the generally accepted version of Germany's social development. Samuel and Thomas have attempted to show the development of German education over the last 150 years as reflecting certain familiar German sociological trends: nationalism, middle-class ideological uncertainty, and the intellectual liberals' complete ineptitude when faced with practical problems.

Put briefly, the case Samuel and Thomas make out is that, under the impact of the French Revolution and Napoleon, German Liberalism began the 19th century with new and undoubtedly popular forms of education. But the impulse did not last; after 1815 ministers and directors of education in the German states turned the schools into sausage-machines for the production of docile citizens. After 1870 the trend was further reinforced by the desire to inoculate the nation against the dangers of socialism. The aggressive nationalism of Wilhelm II and the militaristic intellectuals who supported him further contributed to the burden weighing on the educational system. The political system became top-heavy and collapsed thoroughly in 1918/19. Yet the alterations made by the Republican authorities were ineffective: the authors stress how governmental directives continued to be couched in terms reminiscent of the nationalistic ideas of the 90's and, above all, how the text-books used continued to portray many subjects from a standpoint which could only build up little Germans who continued to believe in the excesses of nationalistic chauvinism.

The authors do not, indeed, overlook the brighter side of the picture, especially the many hopeful experiments in adult education. They examine quite a number of "modern" educationists, their ideas and their schools, and they show too the obstacles in their path. Finally, in each chapter they describe the way in which the particular educational activity was taken over by the Nazis. As those familiar with German history might expect, the Nazi innovations were not all perversions—though all were exploited in the interests of the leadership principle, national brutalization, and other militaristic interests of the Nazi movement.

It is satisfactory that the detailed research and investigation of the authors have shown how correct is the interpretation of modern German history advanced by the best and most detailed historians (Barraclough, Vermeil, Gooch). One minor criticism would be of the lack of references in quoting. A major criticism of wider scope, however, is the comparative neglect of curricular detail. Since the historians have logged the rise and defeat of German nationalism, a book on education which really gave us the subject-matter drilled into little Germans of the 19th century to make them such little chauvinists would be almost more important than the authors' scrupulous charting of the parallel course followed by the educational system. A greedy reviewer may also add his disappointment that the content of adult education was not studied either. In view of the current debates in adult education circles (entertainment versus extension-studies),

it would be most valuable to learn precisely what subjects were studied by the various schools of thought inside the German adult education movement, especially in the years after 1918.

It would be utopian to have expected the authors to have passed a final judgment on the "gymnasium". We are, therefore, still without that valuable book which will tell us how far these "grammar schools" carried out the tasks assigned them by Humboldt and Hegel. The authors show us how the latter's ideas were watered down by narrow-minded administrators yet we know that many excellent teachers taught in the spirit of the founders rather than in that of the departments of education. It is also certain that it was the gymnasia which made of the Germans the nation of "thinkers and dreamers" famed all over Europe up till 1914. It is in a sense irrelevant that the same people also blindly accepted militarism; there were and remained senses in which Germany was the most cultured country in Europe. Bismarck had to introduce pioneering social welfare legislation; at the height of the Wilhelmine period the Youth Movement pioneered extra-curricular interests for young people which have still to be realised in our system; the Weimar adult education world experimented with many features of what Sir Richard Livingstone has popularised as "institutional education" (County Colleges, week-end schools, etc.).

It is, however, also painfully true that it was the social system which made many Germans take up "culture" as a deliberate form of escape. This seems to be evidenced especially in the field of university work. One would like to have an investigation of proceedings of faculty boards in the Wilhelmine period, to see precisely how the staffs envisaged the relation of the universities to the outside world. For there is a case to be made out that that concentration on obscure specialization which marked German scholars at this period was a conscious turning away from "applied" university education. Lilge gives tantalising glimpses of the quarrels around the setting up of independent science faculties and technical universities, a field which Samuel and Thomas barely mention. It is in these debates that one might find one clue to the salient weaknesses in German progressive thought. It is certain that the other clue is to be found in an investigation of the content of education at the lowest levels.

University of Melbourne.

-Derek van Abbé.

THE IDEA OF CONFLICT. By Kurt Singer. (Melbourne University Press. pp. 181).

This very interesting book raises a number of important questions without

providing all the answers. Considering the vastness of the subject, this is not unnatural. To some, the title may convey the idea that the author regards conflict as a feature of life just as normal as order and, although another view is presented in the first two chapters, most of the other chapters tend to confirm this idea. The latter trace the treatment of conflict in the major poetry of certain nations and in the books of certain religions. The view, however, that conflict occupies a foremost place in the thought of most communities, is somewhat misleading. The ideas of poets or religious thinkers bear only a distant relation to the folk ways and norms of communities. The reason why poetry deals so frequently with war is because fighting is exciting and evokes picturesque virtues such as courage. When religion gets beyond the tribal stage and approaches moral problems, it is natural that prophets should dramatise the contest of good and evil. As Dr. Singer shows, competition, emulation, strife and conflict play a part but man can obtain the satisfaction he needs or control his development only when stability transcends conflict.

It is essential to avoid any concession to the view that conflict is normal, that the clash of demi-urgic forces is elemental and inevitable or that order is undesirable or unattainable. After the titanic struggles of the last thirty years, it is, of course, difficult to play down the idea of conflict. The educated youth of twenty now finds the contemplation of world conflict exhilarating just as the boy of ten loves to hear of adventures with head-hunters or Red Indians, and the mood of the adolescent is to treat all attempts a the reintegration of a shattered world as futile. In this way, if we over-emphasise the idea of conflict, we may encourage a fatal form of defeatism. It is notable that, with the exception of Nietsche, most of those who base their philosophy on the inevitability of contradiction, like Hegel and Marx, look forward to a culmination when it will finally disappear—Hegel in the absolute State and Marx in the dictatorship of the proletariat and the disappearance of the State. As we know, Stalin has terminated the dialectical process in Russia. Every contradiction of his orthodoxy is punished, either as a right or left deviation.

I do not for a moment minimise the profound moral crisis in which we now live and Dr. Singer has not exaggerated when he says: "Today it is not only nation that stands against nation, race against race, class against class, sex against sex, youth against age . . . urge against urge, instinct against reason, value against value . . . man against himself." (p. 38).

It is not, however, necessary to advance as a cause of this crisis any tendency to conflict inherent in either man or Nature. Some of the causes of the present crisis are due to recent developments and are quite innocent of felonious intent. For instance, the atomisation of modern society has introduced the most obstinate problems. In earlier societies, the community was more corporate: the individual did not emerge. The difficulties involved in settling the problems of a world in which two billion individuals have wills and ideas of their own are infinitely greater than those involved in the problems of a few groups of people dominated by a few hereditary or feudal leaders. Moreover, this atomisation has brought about new combinations imperfectly known to modern thought. A world divided into Marxian clases on economic grounds will be much more difficult to manage than a world consisting of national groups. Lastly, modern science has an effect on human relations to which we have not made sufficient accommodation. In effect, change is so rapid that our powers of adjustment are overtaxed.

Although Dr. Singer does not raise these questions, he has, in the first two chapters of his book, shown that he knows some of the answers. At p. 34, he says that one of the most searching and sensitive thinkers of the early twentieth century, Georg Simmel, showed that "fight is not a negation of social life but an effort to overcome antagonisms that threaten to disorganise it. The disintegrating element is not combat, strife, but its causes: hate, envy, cupidity. A group which is absolutely centripetal and harmonious would be 'not only empirically ineffective but would show no genuine vital process'. Like the cosmos which is built by love and hate, society stands in need both of harmony and disharmony; positive and negative aspects of life are inseparable; what appears to endanger the life of the organism is as necessary to it as its positive traits which cannot exist without being welded to its antagonistic counterparts: the task is to sense in both the pulse of the one stream of life which abstract thought tends to divide into irreconcilable opposites."

These remarks are profoundly true but they do not meet the problem of violence. Modern weapons are so destructive and so far-reaching that conflict

with such weapons can have no integrating effect and the atom bomb is the

absolute weapon of destruction.

Dr. Singer also, in my opinion, shows the way in which the human mind should approach these questions. "It is from a deeper knowledge of the social and cultural matrix of mental life that the main advance of research on man is to be expected. Such matrices are organic fabrics woven out of ideas and habits which in their turn have grown from thought or must derive their sanction from it . . Interests, even those of the most crude and obvious kind, can become motives only if conceived in terms of thought: neither hunger nor oppression produces revolutions . . . if they do not become thought they will end in mere grumbling or in silent decay . . . Every society achieving that relative coherence and totality of its activities which defines a civilisation, is dominated at each phase by a hierarchy of ideas, clearly or confusedly moulded by a leading thought-image, an archetype it may well be called, from which such ideas derive their measure of validity, amplitude and clarity." (p. 20).

What we suffer from most, more than from wars or violence, is a confusion of ideas. Salvation may come most quickly from a clarification of our ideas on human relations and the ethical presuppositions upon which effective social life

rests-a task which the Social Scientist has so far failed to perform.

-F. W. Eggleston.

# Books Received.

### United Nations Publications.

Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East. Parts I and II.

Economic Survey of Latin America 1948. Annual Review United Nations Affairs.

The United States in World History. (John B. Rae, Thomas H. D. Mahoney. McGraw-Hill Book Company.)

American Politics and the Party System. (H. A. Bone, McGraw-Hill Book Com-

Roosevelt & The Russians. (Edward R. Stettinius. Jonathan Cape, London.)

Wartime Economic Co-operation. (R. Warren James. The Ryerson Press, Toronto.) Problems of Economic Reconstruction in the Far East. (C. Belshaw. I.P.R.) Outer Mongolia and Its International Position. (Gerald M. Friters. The John

Hopkin's Press.)

The Western World & Japan. (G. B. Sansom. Alfred A. Knopf.)

The Nazis Rise Again. (A. W. Sheppard, M.C. E. A. Gornall Industries Pty. Ltd.)

There's Freedom for the Brave. (Paul McGuire. Heinemann.)

Freedom & Planning in Australia. (A. Campbell Garnett, Univ. of Wisconsin.) Modern Missions in the South Pacific. (John Wear Burton, The Livingstone Press, Westminster.)

The Political Handbook of 1950. (Council of Foreign Relations. Harper Bros.)

Notes on Educational Problems In Communist China. (By Michael Lindsay. Published: Institute of Pacific Relations.)

The Development of Upland Areas in the Far East. (Volume I. Published: Institute of Pacific Relations.)

New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion. (By Ssu-yu Teng. Published: Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, U.S.A.)

# Annual Report.

This report reviews the work of the Institute from May 1, 1949, to May 1, 1950. During this period much preparatory work has been done. The results will

show in the year to come.

The experiment of "International Affairs Week", conducted during June 1949, was crippled by the coal strike. Members of both the Victorian and N.S.W. Branches gave broadcast talks and addressed schools and University meetings during International Affairs Week, and at other times have given broadcast talks and addressed public meetings in response to requests received through the Institute. It has been decided not to repeat the experiment of International Affairs Week.

The problem of obtaining good speakers for the Branches in Western Australia, South Australia, Queensland and Tasmania is being solved as more experts in the field of international affairs come to Australia, and the organisation of

the Branches is working more smoothly.

Thanks to the generosity of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and their faith in the work of the Australian Institute, the General Secretary was enabled to visit seven countries and to study the organisation of similar Institutes, Societies and Associations. The results of this tour are beginning to appear.

Many more members seem to be visiting England. They are most grateful for the privileges made available at Chatham House. Arrangements for introductions, etc., can easily be made if those intending to go abroad notify their Branch Secretary. With our affiliations in the U.S.A. and in Europe as well as with Institutes in the member nations of the Commonwealth of Nations, we enjoy membership of a world wide group of societies with common interests.

The General Secretary has instituted a series of informal talks by experts, both visiting Australia and residents. These have been held in Sydney, in the rooms of the N.S.W. Branch. Twelve to fifteen people have attended each meeting. Invitations have been sent to Corporate members and individuals particularly interested in the area or problem under discussion. These meetings have been extremely successful.

# Summary of Activities.

		Members				
BRANCH	Ordinary	Associate	Corporate	Meetings	Public	Discus- sions
New South Wales	522	91	40	10	2	5
Armidale Group	30	5		10	2	
University Group				9		
Victoria	256	21	31	19	6	
Canberra	90	30		24		
Queensland	79	20	2	7		
South Australia	40	2	7	12		
Western Australia	23		2	10		
Tasmania	27		1			

#### Commonwealth Council.

The Commonwealth Council met on August 13th at Sydney and on February 25th at Melbourne. Representation was good on both occasions. At the February meeting six out of the seven Branches were represented.

Officers elected for the year 1949-50 were:

President, N. L. Cowper. Vice-Presidents, Professor W. Macmahon Ball (Victoria); E. A. Ferguson (Queensland); L. H. E. Bury (Canberra); Paul Hasluck (West. Australia); Sir John Morris (Tasmania); A. M. Ramsay (South Australia).

Honorary Treasurer, Russell N. Stokes. Member Pacific Council (IPR) N. L. Cowper. Member International Finance Committee (IPR), Russell N. Stokes. Member International Research Committee (IPR), N. D. Harper. Editor *The Australian Outlook*, Professor J. M. Ward. Chairman Research Committee, N. D. Harper. Members Research Committee, Victoria: Prof. W. G. Friedman, Prof. W. Paton. Canberra: T. Inglis Moore, W. Hartley.

At the meetings, discussion covered activities of the Institute. Mention is here made of major problems, finance and research, and of the decision concern-

ing the Commonwealth Council Library.

#### Finance.

It was decided to approach certain large organisations with Head offices in Sydney and Melbourne and to ask them to authorize the capital city Branch in each State to become a corporate member in each State. Some success has been attained on these lines. It is necessary, however, to obtain many more corporate members to put the finances of the Institute on a firm basis. This needs constant attention by members.

#### Research.

The Chairman of the Research Committee has outlined an integrated programme of research for the coming years.

The immediate necessity is to build up a research fund which would enable

a start to be made on this programme.

There is also the need for close consultation with other research organisations, e.g. Chatham House, Institute of Pacific Relations, South Pacific Commission, University Departments, etc., to avoid unnecessary duplication. There is at present no body in existence which can easily co-ordinate research activities.

Owing to the fact that much of this work is being directed by people who are active members of the A.I.I.A. this is not such an onerous task as it might appear to be. It does require a continuity of approach. At the same time, it is perhaps legitimate to raise the question as to whether there is a special field for research by the A.I.I.A. Foreign policies, in the broadest sense of the term, obviously come within its ambit. What of internal problems of island areas or of neighbouring regions? Past policy would seem to indicate that Australian social end economic problems are also parts of its legitimate field.

The situation in Australia, with a scattered population hitherto largely preoccupied with the development of the continent; whose neighbours are of different races and differing cultures, offers a field for much work of a broad educational kind, the simple exposition of international problems. The Victorian Branch has suggested, and is investigating the possibilities of, the publication of a regular pamphlet series on a subscription and/or sale basis, the pamphlets to appear quarterly or half-yearly, to contain 48 pages and to sell for 2/6. These would be related to, but would cover a wider field than, the main research project.

#### Publications.

#### Published:

The Australian Data Paper No. 1.

Part I. Economic Problems.

Part II. Political Developments Since 1939.

Part III. Strategic Problems.

Part IV. The Future of the British Commonwealth.

The data paper prepared for the B.C.R. Conference was well received. This paper, as a review of the impact of world events on Australia during the last ten years, and particularly since the war, offers a real contribution to international

"Immigration", by W. D. Borrie, M.A. (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, in November 1949). 12/6.

#### In Publication:

Australia and Air Transport: D. M. Hocking and C. P. Haddon-Cave. Publication October 1950.

Australian Colonial Policy in Papua: J. D. Legge. Publication October 1950. Land Utilisation in Australia: S. M. Wadham and G. L. Wood. (Melbourne University Press, 376 pp. and plates. 30th June 1950). The South Seas in Transition: W. E. H. Stanner—1950.

Australia: National Ideas and Values-ed. G. Caiger. Publication June 1950.

#### Library.

It was agreed that the indexing of more recent accessions should be completed as soon as possible; that a book list should be circulated to all Branches; that a list of accessions be printed in The Australian Outlook; that the books should be available to all members on the basis of payment one way by the borrower. Rapid return of such books would be essential. It is hoped to put this scheme into practice before long.

#### "The Australian Outlook."

The circulation has improved during the year. For the March issue, the figures were:-

Instit	ute	Members	1,219
Subsc	ripti	ons	620
		(Exchange)	
			1,889

#### Conferences

The Institute was represented at the following Conferences: International Studies Conference,

Annual meeting held in Paris August 29-September 3rd.

Prof. W. R. Crocker, the first to hold the chair of International Relations at the National University, Canberra, was our delegate to a Conference of those engaged in the teaching of International Relations at Universities. This was held at Windsor, England, from 16-20 March, 1950.

British Commonwealth Relations Conference.

Held at Bigwin Inn near Toronto, Canada, the Institute had five delegates. This was the 4th of a series, another periodical stock-taking of British Commonwealth Relations. The Terms of Reference were:

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"To survey the position of the Member Nations in the post-war world, including the relations bewteen them, and to examine what changes may be required in their policies in the interests of world order and progress."

This Conference was generally held to be the best of the series so far. All delegates greatly appreciated the hospitality of the Canadian Institute and admired the skilled organization which so greatly contributed to its success.

Impressions of this Conference have appeared in The Round Table, Dec. 1949, International Affairs January 1950, The Australian Outlook December 1949, The Indian Quarterly March 1950.

The preliminary official record, "The Adaptable Commonwealth", by F. H. Soward, is now available at all Branches of the Institute.

## Institute of Pacific Relations.

A special Committee meeting was held at Toronto on October 20th to discuss plans for the forthcoming Eleventh Conference of the I.P.R. to be held at Lucknow, India, from October 3-15, 1950. The subject for discussion is "Nationalism in the East and its International Consequences."

# Branch Activities.

#### New South Wales.

A successful reception was held in honour of Professor F. S. C. Northrop at the conclusion of his lecture tour arranged by the Dyason Trust in August 1949. This was attended by 200 members and their guests, in spite of difficulties arising out of the coal strike.

In addition to the monthly meetings, and discussion groups, as the N.S.W. Branch has not yet its own lecture room with facilities for entertainment of guests, two "At Homes" have been held in the Institute room. One was to welcome Sir Angus Gillan, representative of the British Council in Australia. As nearly a hundred new members have joined during the year, another "At Home" was held to enable these new members to meet each other and members of the Council. It is proposed to hold a similar function at regular intervals. The Council entertained a number of speakers at dinner before they addressed the Institute.

#### Publications.

Five monographs have been published, two on China, one on Indo-China, one on Marshall Aid and one on the British Commonwealth Relations Conference at Bigwin Inn.

Four Reviews of the Soviet Press have also been issued.

Miss Monica Gibson unfortunately had to resign for reasons of health. She was succeeded as Secretary by Miss Joyce Ritchie on the 15th February, 1950.

#### Groups.

The University Group comprises members of the staff and students, who are members of the N.S.W. Branch. They conduct their own discussion meetings to forward the objective study of international affairs. This Group in this way introduces the younger generation to the work of the Institute.

The Armidale Group, as will be seen from their ten meetings and two joint meetings with another association, maintains an active life.

#### Victoria.

Library: The library is being used increasingly by members. The number of accessions was larger this year than for some time past. A list of accessions,

with a list of articles in periodicals under subject headings, is sent to members each month.

Publications: Starting with the October 1949 number, the Branch has issued in place of the former survey of press opinion on world affairs, a short summary of events in the South-East Asian-Far Eastern area, with a short section summarising Australian press and broadcast opinion. This survey, "Australia's Neighbours", is sent to all members who wish to receive it, other Branches of the Institute, and a number of other institutions and individuals.

Members of the Branch have continued to contribute to the Australian Outlook.

The following books to appear under the auspices of the Institute have been written by members of the Branch or by people in Victoria: Land Utilisation in Australia, by S. M. Wadham and G. L. Wood; Australian Colonial Policy in Papua, by J. D. Legge; Australia and Air Transport, by D. M. Hocking and C. P. Haddon-Cave.

Members of the Branch are contributing to the data papers being prepared for the I.P.R. conference to be held in India in October.

#### Canberra.

The Membership of this Branch has increased by one-third to 120. This is a considerable achievement, though it must be admitted the Branch is favoured for the arrangement of meetings. Ministers and Australian representatives returning from diplomatic posts overseas are more readily available. They can speak from up to date and first hand experience. Experts in many fields usually visit Canberra, so that meetings are distinguished by quality as well as quantity. Addresses from outstanding visitors have been made possible through the ready co-operation of the authorities of the Australian National University and of Government Departments in Canberra.

### Queensland.

The interest in the meetings is increasing and some most successful evenings have been held.

The initial steps for the formation of a Discussion Group have been taken, and it is anticipated that it will be functioning before long.

At the beginning of the war the Institute Library was stored in a separate room at the University. Difficulties in providing accommodation for it have been overcome. It is now set up at the new offices of the Hon. Secretary.

#### Western Australia.

Progress during 1949-50 has not been as substantial as was anticipated, but the Branch is looking forward with more confidence to the coming year.

This Branch has begun to specialize on questions concerning the Indian Ocean and is keen to obtain information about trends and activities in other countries bordering the Indian Ocean.

Difficulties in obtaining speakers are experienced because of the smallness of Perth, the fact that many visitors do not go so far to the West and that when they arrive by ship, their stay is usually brief. For all these reasons advance information of important visitors is desirable. It would also be appreciated if members of the Institute from other States would advise the General Secretary of their intention to visit Western Australia.

The Branch aims to have one meeting each month except December and January.

#### South Australia.

In South Australia, too, a review of the year's work strikes the same note, one of growing interest and of preparation for the coming year. The first of the Roy Milne Memorial Lectures will be given in Adelaide in June by the Rt. Hon. R. G. Menzies, the Prime Minister.

In the first week of March the General Secretary visited the South Australian Branch. Under the auspices of the Commonwealth Club he addressed some 250 members of the business community in the Town Hall. It was felt that his visit and interviews with influential citizens was of assistance to the Branch.

GEORGE CAIGER, General Secretary.

### THE ROY MILNE MEMORIAL LECTURE.

The Right Honourable R. G. Menzies has consented to give the inaugural lecture in this series on June 26th, 1950, in the Bonython Hall, Adelaide.

The Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, on some aspect of International Affairs, has been made possible through the generosity of Mrs. Roy Milne, of Mount Lofty, S.A., in memory of her husband.

The Lecture will be printed in pamphlet form for wider circulation. Later lectures in this series may be given in other capital cities.

This inaugural lecture by the Prime Minister, with his long personal experience of relations within the British Commonwealth of Nations and with other countries, will undoubtedly mark a significant development in the study of international affairs in Australia.

Members of the Institute from other States who will be in Adelaide on the 26th of June are invited to be present. They are asked to contact the S.A. Hon. Secretary at Churchill Building, 61 Gawler Place, Adelaide.

# BROADCAST TALKS BY BERTRAND RUSSELL.

During his stay in Australia, Bertrand Russell will broadcast four talks for the Australian Broadcasting Commission.

The first of these will be given in the "Guest of Honour" session on Sunday, 25th June at 7.15 to 7.30 p.m. E.S.T. on the Interstate Programme, when Bertrand Russell will tell listeners something of his philosophy of life—of some of his fundamental beliefs and attitudes towards the main perennial and everyday problems of existence.


The other three talks will be given in the Interstate Programme on the following Sundays (2nd, 9th, and 16th July) at 9.15 p.m. E.S.T. The titles will be as follows:

2nd July.—"The World as I See It".—In this talk, Bertrand Russell will tell listeners in simple, but still somewhat philosophical vein, of his conception of the physical world and of man's place in it.

9th July.—"A World Split in Two—Politically".—An analysis of the present world situation—the cleavage between East and West—together with some reference to the divergent social and cultural, as well as the political backgrounds and ideologies.

16th July. "What Hope For Man?"—In this concluding talk, Bertrand Russell will deal with the general overall situation and outlook in today's world, and will tell listeners what, in his opinion, are the prospects for the future.

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